



Ministry of Defence

# Joint Doctrine Publication 5 Command and Control



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Joint Doctrine Publication 5

# **Command and Control**



## Foreword by the Chief of Defence

Joint Doctrine Publication 5: Command and Control is the first publication to address a specific subject at joint level as a supplement to the Netherlands Defence Doctrine. So why a publication about 'command and control'? There are several reasons for this.

Command is the cement which binds the various building blocks of military operations. It gives form and direction to the various capacities and assets and determines how they will be arranged and employed. Without a robust command, even the best personnel and equipment cannot be employed effectively.

It is essential to have a common starting point for the Netherlands armed forces when it comes to command and control. Operations are increasingly conducted in a joint or combined context, and although each of the different Services has its own culture, there must be no need for discussion about the method of command. The basis in this respect is mission command, for which this publication provides the required starting point.

Despite the fact that high-grade technology can lead to vast improvements in quality, command is first and foremost carried out by people. Central in command at every level is the commander, who has leadership qualities and military proficiency, who has management and diplomatic skills and who is also an ambassador for the Netherlands.

This doctrine looks at the military approach to command and control and will thus contribute to the definition of the concept in non-military organisations.

This book is intended to satisfy a need. There are various national and NATO publications which cover aspects of command and control, but until now there has been no national publication which deals comprehensively with the different aspects at joint level. Will this publication meet the whole requirement, therefore? No, but it will offer a solid knowledge base which every serviceman and woman can use.

In the planning, preparation and deployment of personnel and units for operations, I would ask you to make use of the views described in this doctrine.

*Peter van Uhm*  
General  
Chief of Defence of the Netherlands



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## Introduction

Command and control is a function in military operations and consists of the leadership and direction given to a military organisation in the accomplishment of its mission. It is one of the most important functions, as command and control serves to integrate the other functions in military operations, including intelligence, manoeuvre, fire power, combat service support and force protection. Command and control enables military capabilities to be employed effectively and efficiently.

At the operational level, it is about designing and directing joint and combined campaigns and major operations to achieve the military-strategic objectives. The operational level translates the broad, sometimes abstract, military-strategic objectives into concrete, feasible tasks for the tactical deployment of forces in a given area of operations. The military contribution is planned and implemented with other, non-military actors and organisations in a comprehensive approach designed to achieve the desired result.

Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) Command and Control is one of the publications in the joint doctrine structure. It is aimed primarily at commanders and those involved in the exercise of command at operational level. Although it provides guidance for headquarters at operational level, the publication is also useful for commanders and staffs at the strategic and higher tactical levels. JDP-5 is also a reference publication for education and training and provides guidance for the development of derivative doctrine publications; in that sense, the doctrine also aims to provide a springboard for further study of the subject of command and control. This doctrine can be used by non-military organisations for the purposes of information and mutual understanding.

The JDP-5 deals with the principles of decision making and control of the military contribution. First of all, it will look at *what* this entails and will then proceed to examine *who* it involves. Finally, the question of *how* command and control works in practice will be discussed. The chapters are structured as follows:

- Chapter 1 – **Definition and context** - introduces the principles of command and control and the factors that influence it.
- Chapter 2 – **Leadership and the commander** - looks at the role of the commander, his<sup>1</sup> relations with other actors and the support provided by the staff.

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1. 'His' can also be read as 'her' in all cases. 'He' can also be read as 'she' in all cases.

- Chapter 3 – **Staff and support** - discusses the task and organisation of the headquarters and the staff supporting the commander.
- Chapter 4 – **Decision making and control** - examines the main aspects of decision making and control by means of the four stages in the process: analysis, planning, execution and assessment.

Netherlands joint doctrine is based on NATO doctrine publications and is thus closely intertwined with international (doctrine) developments. In principle, NATO doctrine takes priority over national doctrine, particularly in the case of multinational operations. To be able to work in multinational headquarters, personnel must also be familiar with the specific procedures of those organisations.

This doctrine has been developed on the basis of the following starting points:

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- Doctrine is general in nature. That means that JDP-5 defines the principles, assumptions and pre-conditions for command and control. The publication is descriptive, provides handholds for and about command and control, but is not a procedural handbook for a specific unit, operation or process. Where necessary and possible, the reader will be referred to other publications.
- In terms of doctrine, the principles of command and control do not differ according to the type of operation ('operations are operations'). All types of operation are approached in the same way; only the context in which operations are conducted may require a different application of the principles and preconditions.
- Netherlands forces always operate in conjunction with other instruments of power. This publication will regard multinationality as the standard.

The JDP-5 is linked to the following, and other, publications:

- Netherlands Defence Doctrine (NDD), 2005
- CDS *Leidraad 2 Operationeel Planningsproces* ('CDS Field Manual 2: Operational Planning Process')
- Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-01(C), 2007
- Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations, AJP-3(A), 2007
- Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning, AJP-5, 2006 (ratification draft)
- Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP), Allied Command Operations.

# 1. Command and control: definition and context

## 1.1 Introduction

Command and control (C2) is an expression which originated in the military world and, in terms of what it entails, largely corresponds to such civilian concepts as control, management and leadership. It is all about the best possible employment of assets to achieve the selected or assigned objective. The commander leads by means of orders or instructions; he coordinates the activities and at the same time motivates his men through his personal way of acting.

This chapter looks at the general aspects of command and control. It defines the terminology framework associated with command and control and sets command and control in an operational context and environment. This chapter will also look at the principles that underpin the way in which command and control is set up and supported.

## 1.2 Command and control

Command and control is one of the functions in military operations and consists of the leadership and direction given to a military organisation in the accomplishment of its mission. It is one of the most important functions, as command and control serves to integrate the other functions in military operations: intelligence, manoeuvre, fire power, combat service support and force protection. Command and control comprises the three elements of leadership, decision making and control. High-quality command and control<sup>2</sup> enables military capabilities to be deployed effectively and efficiently. Command and control is a universal concept and is not exclusively reserved for the operational deployment of forces. Personnel training and the performance of logistic tasks also require command and control.




Figure 1-1: 'Elements of command and control'

<sup>2</sup> 'High-quality command and control' is one of the seven Essential Operational Capabilities (EOC). EOCs correspond roughly to the functions in military operations and guide the policy on capability development..

Command and control is necessary at all levels in the armed forces and in all sorts of situations. Although it has a broad application in principle, this doctrine will concentrate primarily on the conduct of operations by armed forces.

Command is the authority vested in the commander to lead his troops, take decisions about their employment and issue orders. The exercise of command is the art of making decisions, communicating the commander's intent and imposing his will on his subordinates. The exercise of command gives the commander the authority, the responsibility and also the obligation to act, or indeed to deliberately refrain from action. Decision making and leadership are the primary responsibilities of command and control. Once the decision has been taken, the commander must be able to organise, assign, monitor and, if necessary, adjust the execution of that decision. The commander is thus also responsible for the control of the unit. The elements of command and control are closely interwoven and mutually complementary. The term itself, abbreviated to C2, is internationally recognised; 'command' is regarded as the authority vested in the commander and 'control' as the exercise of that authority.

The commander is supported in this task by command support, otherwise known as the command and control system. This is the entirety of personnel, organisation (structure), equipment and (communication) infrastructure put in place to support the command and control. As well as assets, processes and procedures also play a major role.

Sophisticated computerisation ensures better and faster support, thus increasing the quality and tempo of command and control. No matter how well the command support is set up, command and control will always be a human responsibility. The exercise of command also means taking responsibility; that is all-embracing and indivisible.

In an international context, C2 relates to the control and leadership of multinational, often joint, military formations. Netherlands military personnel may be appointed as commanders of multinational units or as commanders of national units within a larger multinational force. Netherlands military personnel may also work in multinational staffs at various levels. C2 in a purely national context is possible in the case of decision making in respect of the deployment of Netherlands forces, or in the case of deployment in national operations, either in the Netherlands or elsewhere. The distinction will not always be clear in practice. Multinational operations are the norm, but even after individual service personnel or units have been assigned to a multinational force, the national authorities retain certain powers.

## 1.3 Decision making and control

### 1.3.1 Decision making

Decision making<sup>3</sup> should be seen as the process that is conducted to decide on the best way to achieve the assigned or chosen objective in support of the higher commander's intent. The commander is usually supported in this by a staff, which is also responsible for providing the commander with continuous and timely information that is relevant to the necessary deliberation process.

The commander will direct the decision-making process and will ultimately make the decision himself. The emphasis here lies on the quality and the timing of the decisions and the extent to which subordinates and staff understand these. Decision making is intellectual in nature and requires analytical skills and creativity. The quality and timeliness of decisions will be determined by a combination of intuition, experience and effective decision-making methods.

Although the method for reaching a decision is secondary to the quality and timeliness of a decision, a certain technique is essential in the decision-making process. Universally accepted and familiar decision-making models and instruments are necessary for commanders and staff to be able to work together effectively (interoperability) and contribute to high-quality decisions (quality assurance). This applies particularly in cases where a headquarters is informed at short notice, or if there is little time available for the decision making.

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### 1.3.2 Control

Control<sup>4</sup> is the process used by a commander to organise, direct and coordinate the units assigned to him as well as any supporting units. Recording decisions in orders and monitoring the execution of the tasks are examples of control. Particular attention is paid to ensuring that the desired effects, as well as the relationship between them, are clearly understood in order to achieve the desired end state. This will allow the various activities to be harmonised in terms of time and location. Control is a continuous process and does not just start once a decision has been taken.

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<sup>3</sup> The subject of decision making will be explored further in Chapter 4.

<sup>4</sup> The subject of control will be explored further in Chapter 4.

### 1.3.3 Cyclic process

Although the various stages can be individually identified, decision making and control cannot be separated from each other. Both form part of a loop, a cyclic process of analysis, planning, execution and assessment. Control does not just start once the decision making has been completed; the two often run in parallel. Command and control is ongoing, regardless of the phase in which a military operation and/or action happens to be. In the analysis, preparation and planning, as well as in the execution and assessment phases, decisions will be made, control will be required and the commander will be in charge.




Figure 1-2: 'Cyclic decision making'

Generally speaking, decision making focuses on the analysis and definition of the problem and the devising of possible solutions. It is intellectual and creative in nature. Control focuses more on the implementation of the decisions, on the use of time and space. It is more instrumental in nature and thus lends itself more to standardisation and computerisation. The execution of control is often delegated to specialist staffs, systems and organisations, but the commander remains responsible at all times.

## 1.4 Leadership

The provision of leadership<sup>5</sup> focuses on the activities conducted to deliberately influence the behaviour of others to achieve the set objective together, with the full effort of the commander-himself. Leadership is the ability to lead. Every official with a leadership role, so certainly the commander, must possess this ability. He alone is responsible for the coordinated and synchronised deployment of assets.

<sup>5</sup> Leadership will be examined in more detail in Chapter 2.

For this purpose, he has the authority to enforce obedience and compliance with decisions, which means that he bears the legal responsibility for every action or lack of action by all military and civilian personnel under his command. Within the context of C2, the commander leads his subordinate commanders and his staff. Leadership is the projection of the personality and character of an individual, usually the commander, to motivate people to do what is expected of them. There is no formula for successful leadership. Each commander will motivate his soldiers in different ways, using, for instance, his persuasiveness, the strength of his personality, in extreme cases coercion, or a combination of these methods. Leadership is the common thread that runs through C2.

## 1.5 Command support

The C2 system is the commander's primary instrument for collecting, processing, sharing and protecting information required for command and control. C2 systems are designed to provide relevant information in a usable form to enable high-quality and timely decisions to be made and to provide feedback in respect of the desired outcome. These systems thus help to reduce the chaos and uncertainty that typify military operations. Interoperable communication and information systems embedded in a good infrastructure (command post) must ensure the fast, reliable and safe provision of information within the organisation. All systems and instruments available to the commander and his staff to support the decision making (such as decision support tools) also form part of the C2 support. Effective C2 is ultimately dependent on the right information being with the right person at the right time.

## 1.6 Levels of command

Traditionally, several distinct levels have been identified in the conduct of military operations: the strategic, operational, tactical and technical levels. Because command is exercised at each level, the levels of command correspond to the levels of operation or warfare. Although it is not always practical to draw a clear distinction between the levels, they are different in terms of nature and function. Moreover, the organisation of armed forces is usually based on the different levels. In order to gain a proper understanding of the role of the commander, it is important to describe the features of the different levels.



### 1.6.1 Strategic level

The strategic level is all about the coordinated, systematic development and use of the instruments of power of a state, alliance or coalition to protect their respective interests. The instruments of power are normally divided according to type: diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments (DIME). Information can be either an instrument in its own right or a means of applying the other instruments. Selecting or combining the different instruments of power is one of the fundamental strategic decisions that the political leaders must make in any conflict in which they are (or wish to be) involved.

The *political* strategy is the exclusive responsibility of a government, regardless of whether it is acting independently or in conjunction with other governments in a security organisation such as the UN, in an alliance such as NATO or in an ad hoc coalition. The strategy will ideally state the desired political purpose, the aims and preferably the desired end state which will signify success. The strategy sets out the means for the accomplishment of the objectives and the ways in which that will take place. The *military* strategy relates to the coordinated, systematic development and use of the *military* means of a state or alliance to help to achieve the political objectives. The military strategy translates the political aim into military objectives (strategic aim) and allocates military capacity. The strategy also determines the restrictions that apply to the use of the means, without specifying in detail how these means should be deployed.

### 1.6.2 Operational level

The operational level is concerned with the design and execution of campaigns and major operations in the mission area to achieve the strategic objectives. The operational level translates the broad, sometimes abstract, military-strategic objectives into the eventual employment of forces (actual delivery of effect) in a given area of operations<sup>6</sup>. The military contribution must be planned and implemented in association with other, non-military actors and organisations as far as possible in a comprehensive approach designed to achieve the desired result.

The design and planning of a campaign or major operation requires a high level of specialist knowledge of operations by the different Services and other ministries. There is a clear distinction between the operational level and the military-strategic level. While the commander at operational level must be fully aware of the intended political purpose,

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<sup>6</sup> The Chief of Defence (CHOD) is responsible for the operational deployment of the armed forces. In that role, as corporate operator, he is responsible for translating the political aims and directives into feasible military objectives down to the tactical level. The military objectives must be specific, measurable, acceptable, realistic and timed (SMART).



he himself is not usually the one who interacts directly with the politico-strategic decision makers.

### **1.6.3 Tactical and technical level**

Tactics are the methods of deployment and employment of forces in a certain cohesion designed to help to achieve the operational objectives of a campaign. Unlike the operational level, the military personnel and units under command at the tactical level come into direct contact with the parties in the conflict. The technical level is concerned with the methods of deployment and operation of small units, platforms and even individual personnel or weapon systems.

### **1.6.4 Interaction between the different levels**

Each level of command translates the higher aims and intentions into concrete objectives and desired effects at its own level. This gives rise to a hierarchy of objectives (known as nesting), which will help in the realisation of the desired end state. The levels of command provide a framework for the design, planning and execution of operations and are a useful instrument for organising military capabilities and activities. There are no strict rules which govern where decisions must be taken or how events should be isolated from each other. The distinction between the levels is rarely a clear one. In the current context of operations, the 'traditional' levels tend to overlap and merge with each other.

The actions of units or individuals at tactical level could have strategic implications; strategic decisions can have a major impact on the tactical level. This is referred to as 'strategic compression'<sup>7</sup>. In reverse, this also means that commanders at lower tactical level have to think at operational level in order to be able to achieve the desired effects in the long term.

The levels of command that are applied in military thinking are not necessarily used in the diplomatic or economic spheres. Even there, however, different levels of decision making and planning can be distinguished and authority is assigned for the deployment of personnel and equipment<sup>8</sup>. What is important is that coordination of the necessary activities takes place at all levels.



<sup>7</sup> Although the different levels overlap substantially in practice and there is a discernible trend in modern operations in which the 'traditional' tactical level increasingly bears the hallmarks of the operational level, NATO's command structure is still clearly divided: the two strategic commands ACO and ACT at strategic level, three commands at operational level (the joint force commands) and, at tactical level, the commands for the individual components of the attached naval, land and air forces.

<sup>8</sup> In the commercial world, for example, a distinction is often made between the strategic level (direction, vision) and the tactical level (concrete objectives), in which case the term 'operational' is reserved for the lower (executive) level.

## 1.7 Factors of influence on command

The components which make up command are universally valid. The way in which command is exercised, such as the structure and the style, depend on various factors of influence which will differ according to time and place. C2 may also be influenced by the prevailing views on military operations in general. This section will present a summary of significant factors which could determine the conduct of C2.

### 1.7.1 Joint Operations

The term 'joint operations' refers to the integrated deployment under single command of operational units or personnel from more than one Service or part of the Defence organisation (including the Support Command (CDC) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD)), as well as the measures, organisational methods, etc, which lead to such a deployment. Joint operations are primarily designed to ensure effective deployment<sup>9</sup>.

This 'jointness' aims to integrate and optimise the specific capabilities of the different components (operational commands in the case of Netherlands armed forces) in such a way that they reinforce each other. 'Joint' does not mean that all components will participate in a specific operation merely because they are there. 'Jointness' in command does not, therefore, simply mean a proportionate representation of all Services, but involves a mix of mutually supplementary relevant expertise and experience which can be used to form an effective force or headquarters. The commander of a joint unit has the responsibility and the authority to select from the capabilities available to him those capabilities that will lead most effectively and efficiently to success. Successful joint operations involve teamwork based on cooperation and confidence in each other's abilities. The synergy generated by joint operations enlarges the available capability and increases the likelihood of a better outcome.

The decision making and integrated planning for joint operations will often take place at operational level. Joint operations are often associated with this higher level, although today's operations show that joint operations also occur at the lower, tactical level. In this case, it is often about the *execution* of activities for the actual realisation of effects. The joint nature of operations places heavy demands on the coordination of capabilities. Interoperability, training and joint doctrine are important requirements for optimising joint deployments.

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<sup>9</sup> source: corporate definitions framework (2008)



Military personnel are often older by the time they find themselves working in a joint environment.<sup>10</sup> Because a large number of military personnel spend a substantial part of their career in their 'own' Service, they usually have a better knowledge of, greater experience in and more affinity with that part of the organisation. As well as cultural differences, there are also Service-specific differences in command which could have an effect. The specific way command is approached from the particular domains of sea, land and air may be different. Air forces, for example, almost always adhere to centralised planning and decentralised execution because of scarce resources, whereas land forces often have a greater degree of decentralisation. The geographical characteristics of land, sea and air also form a completely different frame of reference for time and space factors, which can lead to differing views about organisational structures or requirements for situational awareness<sup>11</sup>.

It is important that commanders do not ignore the differences that exist in terms of opinions and culture, but that they actually use the strong points while at the same time creating a common or joint frame of reference.

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<sup>10</sup> Growing numbers of service personnel participating in modern operations are, however, experiencing joint aspects earlier in their career.

<sup>11</sup> See also paragraph 4.5.3.



### 1.7.2 Multinationality

Deployment of the armed forces in a multinational coalition<sup>12</sup> such as NATO is the usual situation in today's operations. The reasons for multinational operations may vary. Normally, only a coalition is able to assemble the various capabilities necessary for a successful operation. In addition, multinationality also provides the necessary political and social support and legitimacy. The national interests of the members of the multinational group will determine the nature and size of the contribution that the countries are prepared to make and thus the strength and effectiveness of the force. The contributions made by these countries should not only be judged on the basis of the actual operational capabilities of the troops supplied, but also in terms of the politico-military advantages generated by their participation. These advantages could be the fact that the risk is shared, a demonstration of the willingness to act and the positive influence on national and international opinion and support. The military advantage is that cooperation adds to the force in terms of quantity (more troops) and quality (scarce specialist capabilities). Cooperation also means access to important information and intelligence and enables the efficient use of logistic assets.

<sup>12</sup> Multinational operations are usually conducted within the structure of an international security organisation, an alliance or coalition. An alliance is a relationship based on a formal agreement (a treaty, for example) between two or more countries, involving general long-term objectives which serve the common interests of the members. A coalition is an ad-hoc alliance between two or more countries in order to conduct a joint action with a more limited common interest. Coalitions are normally formed on the basis of specific aims and are often a

Multinationality also brings restrictions, however, which affect the operational effectiveness of the force. These are the national restrictions and conditions (caveats) which apply to the deployment of the assigned troops and units. In many cases, there are also shortcomings in respect of interoperability which have an adverse effect on the cohesion and capacity of the force. Multinational operations create opportunities but also limitations, and commanders must be able to deal with that paradox. They must find a balance between multinationality and operational effectiveness.<sup>13</sup>



<sup>13</sup> The commander's role versus multinationality is explored further in Chapter 2.

### 1.7.3 Comprehensive approach

The Netherlands aims to achieve a comprehensive approach in the resolution of conflicts, thus ensuring the integrated deployment of the various instruments available to the state, or: the state's instruments of power. The core competence of the military is the threat or actual use of force. The armed forces can also make a local and temporary contribution to activities related to stability and (re)construction. The military instrument is hardly ever a contribution in its own right but usually forms part of a broader package. The military contribution often creates the conditions for and is complementary to other structural measures designed to resolve the conflict in the long term. It focuses on establishing a safe and stable situation through the targeted deployment of a mix of military kinetic and non-kinetic assets. For a successful comprehensive approach, all assets - military and non-military - must be planned and deployed jointly from the very beginning.

The comprehensive approach in a national perspective requires the integral planning and implementation of the contribution of various ministries by means of integration, synchronisation and coordination of the activities at the various operational levels. In the Netherlands comprehensive approach, one often talks about contributions aimed at the focal areas of 'diplomacy, defence and development'. In effect, this '3D' method is an interpretation of the comprehensive approach which highlights the spearheads on which the deployment is focused. The sectors on which a comprehensive approach is focused are thus not limited. Generally speaking, they may include the following: security, governance, rule of law, economy, development and social welfare. Of course not all conflicts require the deployment of capabilities in all these sectors, although in most cases there is a need for a comprehensive approach in order to be prepared for the transition to a post-conflict situation.

Given that the armed forces are internationally oriented, operations will in principle be conducted as part of a coalition. For the comprehensive approach, this represents a challenge. Activities by the various participating nations must be integrated, synchronised and coordinated within the coalition group. Another factor are the activities by international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other organisations active in the coalition's area.

The success of the comprehensive approach lies in the challenge of achieving integration and coordination at the various levels, aimed at establishing unity of opinion in respect of the intended objectives:

- at international level between countries and international organisations;
- at national and interdepartmental level, the integration of the different instruments of a state;
- between different state and non-state actors, such as NGOs;
- within the armed forces, the integration of assets and functions.

All actors who play a role in the comprehensive approach bring their own specific expertise and experience and have their own norms and values and often differing work methods. Good cooperation and coordination of activities is only possible if there is a basis of mutual trust. A knowledge and understanding of each other's interests, abilities and needs will promote that trust. At all levels of military operation, within and outside the mission area, clear consultative structures are necessary for civil-military and politico-military coordination.



#### 1.7.4 Political dimension

All military activities are obviously affected, and sometimes even determined, by political considerations. In reverse, military activities will also affect the political situation in and outside the mission area. At all levels of command, therefore, account must be taken of the political dimension. For this, commanders must be provided with good political advice, either by special advisers (political advisers, civil representatives) or guidelines via the chain of command. The extent to which the national politics of a troop-contributing nation will influence the execution of an operation varies considerably. The level of influence will be determined by, for example, national or party-political interests or by cultural and historical views about deployment of the armed forces.

#### 1.7.5 Legal aspects

The execution of military operations is rooted in the international legal system and in the legal systems of the participating states. This system of laws and treaties determines the boundaries within which the deployment of troops takes place and within which the use of force is permitted. Legal considerations play an important role in the decision making about and the execution of operations. The legitimacy of an operation is largely determined by the extent to which actions are in accordance with the prevailing rules. It is extremely important that all nations and troops participating at all levels in an operation have a clear idea of the legal framework that applies. There are occasionally differences of opinion between participating states on the subject of that framework; in such cases, it is important that these differences are communicated. International legislation imposes restrictions, but also provides opportunities for units and individual military personnel. Familiar legal themes in command are neutrality, the use of force, the prevention of undesirable collateral damage, war crimes, self-defence and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. A knowledge of International Humanitarian Law and local legislation is, therefore, essential for a commander.

Military actions and the use of force are controlled by the application of rules of engagement (ROE). These are authorised at the highest level of the coalition or international organisation (NATO, EU) when the operation plan is approved. Amendments to the applicable ROE can be proposed by all commanders, but they will have to be submitted by the operational commander for approval at the highest level. ROE indicate the permissible level and methods for the use of force and are intended to control that use. The fact that an action is in keeping with the ROE is not the only determining factor in respect of the legitimacy of that action. The use of force must at all times comply with the requirements of necessity and proportionality: the commander is responsible for this decision.



#### 1.7.6 Culture, ethics, norms and values

Military personnel frequently come into contact with actors from other cultures, each with different norms and values. This requires knowledge and the ability to empathise on the part of all military personnel who come into contact with the local population, but on the part of the commander in particular. It is he, after all, who chooses the best approach for achieving the desired effect. With a diversity of actors, parties and opponents, this requires a differentiating approach. As well as conflicts which involve traditional warfare between two states, modern conflicts are also described as ‘war amongst the people’<sup>14</sup>. Conflicts are also played out in and around populated areas, where the will and support of the population constitute “ground” to be won. Moreover, opponents could make use of irregular combat methods which are at odds with international and humanitarian law. The norms and values adhered to by friendly forces are, however, based on those laws. This gives rise to an asymmetry which may be seen by some as an unfair fight, in which the opponent has greater freedom of action because he does not feel bound by international law regarding the use of force. It goes without saying that the international community and the force will at all times abide by their own norms and values with regard to methods and the use of force. Commanders at all levels must ensure that their personnel act within the priorly established legal and ethical parameters.

<sup>14</sup> *The Utility of Force*, Rupert Smith (2005).

### 1.7.7 The importance of intelligence and information

No information, no operation. Intelligence is the upshot of knowledge and understanding of the activities, capabilities and intentions of all (relevant) actors and factors. The military intelligence function provides as complete and up-to-date a picture of the situation as possible and is an essential condition for the ability of a military unit to function.

Intelligence is formed by means of the targeted collection and analysis of information. The commander will guide the intelligence process, focusing his attention not only on the 'traditional' aspects of enemy, climate and terrain, but also on information about the historical, cultural, social and religious background to a crisis and the place, as well as the role and meaning, of all other actors<sup>15</sup>.

Intelligence capabilities (ISR capabilities<sup>16</sup>) form part of various networks and it must be possible to establish links between them (modular and interoperable). A network-based approach will support the collection, analysis and dissemination of the right, relevant information to benefit short action/reaction times and rapid decision making.

A commander will almost always be faced with uncertainty as a result of a lack of information. Although there will be a great deal of information available in general terms, it will not always be clear which information is relevant and the information will not always be available at the right level. The relevance of the available information could change quickly as a result of changes in the geographical space, the interaction between the many actors, the operating methods of the opponents and the composition of the coalition in the mission area. Any uncertainty resulting from a perceived lack of information must not, however, be allowed to lead to the postponement or absence of decisions and thus to operational paralysis. At the same time, hasty decision making on the basis of insufficient or incorrect information in a complex environment with a great many actors could produce undesirable side effects.

The sharing of relevant information between the parties involved (military and non-military) is vital for situational awareness and a common understanding. This is often restricted by rules governing information security, but also by an unwillingness to share information (information is power). Although there will always be circumstances which prohibit the sharing of information, the will to share must be at the forefront (the 'duty to share'). Information security must focus on the way in which information can be safeguarded

<sup>15</sup> The analysis of the operating environment may be conducted on the basis of the PMESII factors (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information - see also Chapter 4).

<sup>16</sup> *Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance.*

without affecting the effectiveness of the support. Risk management also forms an integral part of information security. The challenge lies in finding (technical) solutions which are affordable and feasible, with a level of risk that is acceptable to the organisation.

#### **1.7.8 The information environment**

There is increasing evidence of a shift from conventional conflicts between states to conflicts between non-state actors, in which political and social tensions are complicated even further by ideological, religious and cultural differences. Support from the local population for the local authorities and the military operation is an important factor of influence. This also applies to the actors conducting asymmetric operations in the mission area who are not capable of standing up to a superior force in terms of conventional technology and seek other environments in which to win their battles. Their activities in the physical environment mainly serve to support their information activities, with influencing the population and, for example, local political parties being paramount.

The above aspects of military operations are played out in the information environment, which is made up of the information itself and information systems, including the human element. It is the environment in which people take in information, familiarise themselves with the situation on the basis of information and make decisions on the basis of information. The information environment is thus the most important environment in decision-making processes.

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The commander is expected to be capable of controlling not only the physical environment but also indeed the information environment, as essential effects can be achieved in that environment in respect of the perception and understanding on the part of actors in the mission area. The operationalisation of the information environment takes place through military information operations (info ops).

#### **1.7.9 The media**

The media are part of the information environment as they play an important role in forming the public image. The media are constantly monitoring and evaluating the operation. The public image is not, therefore, confined to the actual mission area; the image portrayed to people at home (including politicians) indeed plays a major role. In a transparent information society, one must be aware that every action quickly becomes common knowledge and may result in a value judgement.



The media play a key role in preserving public support and international approval for the operation. Commanders should be aware at all times that the image conveyed by the media with regard to the activities could have a huge influence on the international community, their own home front and, not least, on the attitude of the parties in the mission area.

The presence of media in the mission area, whether they are ‘embedded’<sup>17</sup> or independent, is something that has to be dealt with by commanders at all levels. A proactive and well-coordinated approach to the media is thus an important factor in military operations. Media contacts will ideally be conducted on the basis of an information strategy. There will be avid media interest in all phases of an operation, but the number of media representatives actually present in the mission area will depend mainly on accessibility, the individual interest of reporters and the level of security in the area.

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<sup>17</sup> ‘Embedded’: ‘attached to a military unit’. Comes from the Anglo-Saxon world, where journalists have long been permitted to report on military operations. Embedded reporters can play an important role in the success of the mission by helping to gain understanding and support with their reports from the area. Embedded reporters must abide by a code of conduct. They must not publicise any information which could jeopardise the safety of the troops.

#### 1.7.10 Freedom of action

The commander is expected to design, plan and execute all military activities in such a way as to achieve the assigned objectives. In order to do so, and to be able to respond to unforeseen situations or new opportunities, the commander must have sufficient freedom of action. It is vital that a commander has enough freedom of action to be able to deploy his attached naval, land and air forces, deploy the reserves and set priorities. The degree of freedom allocated to a commander, however, depends heavily on the nature of the conflict and the associated legal aspects, the cohesion between the military and non-military activities within the comprehensive approach and the national and international interests at stake. The deployment of armed forces is often the subject of close political scrutiny, which means that there is a risk of 'back-seat driving' or micromanagement from a high level. This can have a restrictive effect on the degree of a commander's freedom.

The time-honoured traditional levels of military operations – strategic, operational, tactical and technical levels – are becoming entwined. At the same time, responsibilities for decision making and execution are being laid at ever lower levels as a result of increasing complexity on the ground. Commanders at tactical level conduct operations in which they have access to a wide range of assets and in which the effects of their actions could have far-reaching repercussions, also outside the traditional military domain. These consequences are partly determined by the speed with which information about operations is distributed and by the perception of that information. Commanders must learn to cope with this 'strategic compression'.

#### 1.7.11 Availability of means

The means and capacities available to a commander are tangible and material in nature, such as ships, aircraft and land units. They could also be non-material in nature, such as permission to use an area or the delegated authority to have a particular capability for a certain period. Commanders at operational level will hardly ever have all the means and capabilities they need at their immediate disposal, either because they are simply not available, or because troop-contributing nations have them but are not supplying them, or because national caveats are restricting the deployment. When resources are in short supply, the basic principle of military operations, 'concentration', and the counterpart of that principle, 'economy of effort', are extremely important at the operational level in particular. In the event of scarce resources, assets will be assigned to the level at which they can be deployed most effectively and efficiently.

## 1.8 Three pillars of command

There are three approaches which determine the style of command: the network approach, mission command and the effects-based approach.




Figure 1-3: 'Pillars of Command and Control'

### 1.8.1 Network approach

Military operations of the future will be supported by a network in which sensors, weapon platforms and units will be linked to each other. This network must be flexible, interoperable and globally accessible to allies and partners. Such a network will provide a rapid and targeted flow of information designed to achieve a higher tempo of action and decision making than the opponent's. In NATO, the developments in this sphere are referred to as network-enabled capabilities (NEC).

Network-based actions will support the possibility of constantly creating and sharing an integrated and evaluated situational picture. This will enable a shared situational awareness and common understanding of the environment in which military personnel are operating, thus reducing uncertainty as much as possible. Network-based actions will also allow deliverers of effects ('shooters') to be linked to sensors. Together with the integrated common operational picture, this will ensure greater precision and more speed on the part of deliverers of effects.



Network-based operations are highly important for the quality of command. Progress in this field is often driven by civilian technology, whereby the challenges for the commander are not so much technical as human in nature. Technology-driven support must not, however, be allowed to gain the upper hand in respect of the human factor and human creativity.

The social network is, therefore, just as relevant as the technological network. Social networks serve to build trust between the users. Knowing and trusting people thus continues to be the basis for network-based operations, which means that, despite all the modern technology, the deployment of liaison personnel remains valid within the NEC concept. It will never be possible to reflect the 'emotional' side of information in digital data. The power of informal social networking should not be underestimated. By sharing information within social networks, formal structures (staff or unit) can sometimes be circumvented. For the management and preservation of information, knowledge and experience, it is important to consider how the informal information (from social networks) can be safeguarded in the technical networks and information infrastructure.

### 1.8.2 Mission command

In the Netherlands armed forces, mission command<sup>18</sup> is the primary style of command. The idea of mission command is that by establishing and communicating the commander's intent, as much freedom of action as possible is given to the lower executive levels. The intent focuses more on the context in which the task has to be performed and the desired results and effects, and less upon the way in which they are achieved. Authority for the execution is decentralised. In other words, authority is delegated to the lowest appropriate level for the most effective and efficient deployment of equipment and capabilities. The short supply of assets and capabilities, as in the case of air power, for example, may mean that the options for the delegation of this authority are limited. Chapter 2 will take a closer look at mission command and the conditions needed to use it successfully.

### 1.8.3 Effects-based approach

At the heart of the effects-based approach is the fact that military operations are not conducted in a vacuum. Countless factors and actors will affect the result of the deployment of military potential. A comprehensive approach to conflicts ensures that activities take place in various areas in pursuit of a common goal. One way to synchronise all these activities is to think in terms of the desired effects and outcome.

<sup>18</sup> Mission command is synonymous with *Auftragstaktik* in German and *opdrachtgerichte commandovoering* in Netherlands.

It is then the effects, and not the assets, which are key to supporting the accomplishment of the objectives. By first conducting a thorough analysis of the complex problems in the mission area and the underlying causes, one can determine which effects will eventually lead to the desired end state. Only after these effects have been established will activities and then assets be linked to them. The effects-based approach is not a concept in itself but a guideline that can be used in all phases of the decision-making process.

## 1.9 Principles of command

This section looks at the principles which determine the style of command and the setup of the force's C2 structure. These principles are derived from current NATO doctrine, the Netherlands Defence Doctrine and the latest insights gained from operations.

### 1.9.1 Unity of command and unity of effort

Unity of command, ideally through single leadership, contributes substantially to the necessary unity of effort. Single leadership means that no two commanders have the same command relationship in respect of the same force at the same time.

Inherent to command is the authority that a commander has in respect of his subordinate troops and the authority to give orders to those troops and to be accountable for them. The commander's authority is set out in command relationships during the formation of the multinational force. The nature of the command relationship<sup>19</sup> will determine the restrictions that apply to the deployment of nationally allocated troops.

Unity of command is important for military operations, but at the same time one of the most difficult issues to resolve in a multinational environment with a multitude of actors. Single leadership in respect of all assets and actors is virtually impossible in practice. The often differing objectives and the independent position of non-military actors (IOs, NGOs, etc) generally get in the way of formal relationships of authority with military commanders. Informal, less authoritative relationships can be established by means of coordination and liaison. In many cases, the commander himself will have to establish a form of unity through personal contact. In some cases, direct interaction between organisations might be impractical or undesirable.

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<sup>19</sup> The command relationships, such as OPCOM, OPCON and TACON, are examined further in Annex 2-1.

Sharing general information with each other and each thus knowing what the other is doing is the most that can be achieved in that case.

Unity of effort is one of the principles of joint operations and aims to establish cohesion in the planning and execution of military operations. It concerns the coordination and cooperation between all elements of a force towards a jointly identified and accepted objective, while they do not necessarily form part of the same command structure. The clear formulation of support relationships<sup>20</sup> encourages cooperation between different components of the force at horizontal level.

All actors who contribute to a campaign or joint operation should strive for, or be encouraged to strive for, optimum unity of effort, designed to achieve a common goal (unity of purpose). A clear understanding of the problem and the desired end state provides direction for all activities, regardless of which organisations or individuals are responsible for their execution. In the comprehensive approach, in which the non-military effort usually takes precedence, military units support the civil effort, or they create the necessary conditions. The dynamics and complexity in the mission area mean that responsibility and leadership could shift on a localised and temporary basis between the military and civil authorities. Commanders must be prepared for this.

### 1.9.2 Clear chain of command

An unambiguous and balanced structure for the command is essential for effective military operations and unity of effort.<sup>21</sup> Situations in which chains of command exist with different international organisations (dual key) should be avoided. The structure of the command is usually hierarchical and should be understood by all command levels. This means that command relationships must be properly established and that there is a need for clear delineation between the various roles and responsibilities in the chain. The staff of a higher (joint) commander has no direct authority over the staff of a lower commander.

### 1.9.3 Continuity of command

Command is a continuous activity and must be assured throughout the entire duration of the operation or campaign. A smooth succession of command in time and location is vital for the continuity and must be planned in advance.

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<sup>20</sup> Zie hoofdstuk 2 voor beschrijving van steunrelaties.

<sup>21</sup> In bijlage 1-1 zijn een drietal generieke C2 structuren opgenomen: geïntegreerd, lead nation en framework nation.



Succession in time occurs by means of the careful preparation and execution of a rotation, with the necessary overlap for the transfer and takeover of command<sup>22</sup>. Succession in location can be brought about by using well-equipped replacement headquarters and command posts. The latter is also important as a fallback for operational contingencies.

#### 1.9.4 Integration of command

All components, supporting elements and capacities which are contributing to the operation must be integrated in a joint structure, which enables effective and efficient management. Moreover, the structure should right from the start take account of the presence of non-military actors. The command structure must ensure that the available capacities can actually be used to help to achieve the operational objectives. Given the joint nature of the force, it will also be necessary to bear in mind the specific characteristics, doctrines, procedures and assets of each of the components.

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<sup>22</sup> A substantial part of the staff usually rotates along with the commander.

The different components to which the countries make their contributions are normally domain-specific (maritime<sup>23</sup>, land, air) or function-specific (for example, special operations, information operations, etc). The specific task organisation will, however, be tailored to each operation by the higher command. A clear command structure will benefit the integration. If national elements are required for command (contingent command or senior national representative), these should be created separately in addition to the multinational joint structure. An extensive liaison structure is a vital part of the joint structure. The liaison organisation links the joint headquarters to all elements of the force and other non-military organisations.

#### 1.9.5 *Span of control*

The number of units, assets and capabilities over which a military commander could have direct command is not unlimited. The required range depends on his task and the possibilities for direct management. The eventual span of control depends on many factors, such as the available capacities and weapon systems, the nature and number of tasks and activities, the extent to which networking is conducted and a situational picture can be created and shared, the size and complexity of the mission area and the degree of decentralisation in the command. If the situation is changing constantly and rapidly, a commander will be able to manage fewer elements directly. It is impossible to give an exact figure.

#### 1.9.6 *Interoperability*

The nature and complexity of a joint and combined operation and the composition of the force will determine the necessary level of interoperability and the standards associated with it. There are different forms of interoperability: doctrinal, procedural, technical, linguistic, organisational and cultural. Interoperability is primarily based on operational standardisation through joint doctrines, harmonised processes and procedures and joint education and training. A lack of interoperability will have an adverse effect on the cohesion and capabilities of the force. Differences in doctrine and procedure will reduce the degree to which units from different countries and/or services are able to work together effectively. Language problems can result in miscommunication and different interpretations in respect of the tasks to be performed. Technical standardisation is also essential for interoperability and is benefited by the development of interoperable ISR, IT and logistic standards. A lack of interoperability as a result of differing IT standards could result in the inability to exchange or communicate information and intelligence.

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<sup>23</sup> In het maritieme domein wordt onderscheid gemaakt in organisatie naar type maritieme oorlogvoering (*anti air, anti submarine, anti surface*), type schip (schepen van dezelfde soort bij elkaar onder een commandant) en taak (eenheden met dezelfde taak bij elkaar).

The deployment of liaison personnel between units and organisations could also help towards better mutual understanding and interoperability. Headquarters must have made preparations to deploy and receive liaison personnel to and from other units and organisations.

#### **1.9.7 Robust communication and information systems (CIS)**

Robust support is required at all levels. The timely establishment of a good CIS is a deciding factor in high-quality command and thus fundamental to success in any operation or campaign. Safe and interoperable CIS equipment with the relevant procedures and applications must be available at all levels throughout the whole of the joint mission area. The CIS system will enable the staff to manage the information flow and the operation and will thereby provide the commander with the environment in which he can make his decisions.



The joint command structure and the support must be deployable on an expeditionary basis in all types of operations. By making use of the specialist capabilities of the individual components, joint headquarters can be deployed on land, at sea and in the air. Use of modern ICT equipment will allow a headquarters to spread its assets throughout different locations and still guarantee the continuity of command.

**1.9.8 Flexibility and adaptability**

During the operation, it may be necessary to adapt the command structure to changed circumstances or to develop it further on the basis of lessons learned or experience. The joint C2 must, therefore, have sufficient flexibility, adaptability and redundancy to allow for this from the initial structure.




Figure 1-4: 'Elements, pillars and principles of command and control'

## 2. Leadership and the commander

### 2.1 Introduction

Given that the commander occupies centre stage in command and control, this chapter will examine the various roles played by the commander at operational level. It will also look from the commander's point of view at his relationships with his environment. The commander's approach to staff is also discussed, as are his relationships with subordinate units and with actors who do not form part of the formal military structure. The chapter also defines the specific role of commanders in a joint multinational environment and the role played by national contingent commanders. Leadership is the thread that runs through C2, which means that looking at the commander in effect also covers leadership and management. That is why this chapter underlines the importance of leadership and concludes with an outline of a number of qualities possessed by a commander in an operational environment.

### 2.2 Roles of the commander

A commander's main responsibility is to take timely and high-quality decisions and to lead their implementation. He does not do this in isolation, but in consultation with his staff, subordinate commanders and, if necessary, adjacent commanders or special advisers. He can thus leave the issuing of routine instructions to his staff, although the ultimate and indivisible responsibility rests entirely with him. Decision-making, control and leadership are on the one hand determined by individual actions and, on the other, by the interaction between individuals. The commander also has other roles in this respect: as leader, coach, subordinate commander, partner, diplomat and representative of the Netherlands.

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#### 2.2.1 The commander as a leader and executive

The commander must be constantly aware that he as an individual has been given the authority to lead the unit under his command. He is thus responsible for the coordinated and synchronised deployment of personnel and equipment. He is obliged to deploy his attached personnel and equipment in such a way as to achieve the required objectives. On the other hand, however, there must be no unnecessary risk to these assets, nor should they be put under unnecessary strain. A commander must be aware of what his attached personnel and equipment can and cannot do. He must, therefore, be open to advice from his subordinate commanders and his staff, whether or not he has requested it.

The commander sets an example for everyone in the unit and provides leadership and guidance whenever necessary, but at the same time allows the necessary freedom of action wherever possible.

Although the commander is also a leader to his staff, most of all they need a clear vision from the commander with regard to the objectives and how he thinks they should be achieved. Staff officials are incorporated in the organisation to give advice in a specific field and they expect their specialist skills to be respected. In a staff where there are high levels of specialist skills and expertise, there is a risk that the staff officials will lose sight of the higher aim, which could result in suboptimization. A commander should guard against this.

Commanders and staff must understand each other and know exactly what they can expect from each other. Besides his functional staff, the commander often has a personal staff too. A commander benefits from the fact that his staff includes people who can provide independent and impartial advice, requested or otherwise. A commander must avoid including only like-minded people in his staff. Different opinions and another way of looking at issues and situations will help to avoid the phenomenon of groupthink.



### 2.2.2 The commander as a coach

In order to increase the output on the actions of his unit and subunits, the commander has to invest a great deal of time and energy in his subordinate commanders, whom he will have to supervise and coach not only during operational deployment, but also during the general or specialised training beforehand. The regular organisation of exercises and training is a vital instrument in this respect. The personal development of his people is key. In the worst case, however, he must also have the courage to relieve unsuitable subordinate commanders of their post if they do not function properly or turn out to be untrainable.

### 2.2.3 The commander as a subordinate commander

Providing leadership also means being able to receive leadership. No matter how far up the hierarchy a commander is, there will always be a higher commander above him. In most cases, that will be a higher-ranking serviceman, maybe from a different service and possibly of a different nationality. A commander must be well aware that he is only part of the greater whole. Whatever he expects from his subordinate commanders, he must also strive to achieve as a subordinate commander himself.

A subordinate commander will usually have a number of adjacent commanders. If these adjacent commanders have the same type of unit, coordination with them, under the responsibility of the higher commander, will normally be fairly straightforward. If, however, the commander has a unique and specialised type of unit, the specialist capabilities should be fully brought into their own in the joint force. In such cases, the commander will also act as an adviser and special staff officer to the higher commander and his staff.

It may be the case that a commander of a military unit will be operating under the leadership and responsibility of a civil authority for part or all of an operation. Civil authorities have their own corporate culture. Commanders and their staffs must, therefore, have the ability to adapt and empathise, have respect for others and a desire to work together. A clear military command structure and C2 will provide the civil leader and his staff with the necessary insight into the military unit. By the same token, the civil organisations must provide a clear view of their organisational structure and decision-making processes.

### 2.2.4 The commander as a partner

Military operations are rarely, if ever, planned or executed in isolation. Almost all other ministries and organisations, such as IOs and NGOs will be active in the mission area at the same time. Not least, commanders will also have dealings with official and unofficial leaders of the local population.



Integration and cohesion with other actors and parties are vital. All actors will thus be forced, as it were, to work together or at least to avoid hampering one another. To all those other actors, the commander represents the military instrument. He has to be a reliable partner who, with his specialist expertise, experience and assets, can contribute towards the accomplishment of the objectives.

#### **2.2.5 The commander as a diplomat and 'public face'**

The commander is a representative of the Netherlands defence organisation and, as such, of the Netherlands nation. He must ensure that the actions of his unit remain within the parameters of the relevant legislation and our national values. He will also, especially in an international environment, be required to behave diplomatically. Netherlands service personnel and commanders, particularly those in key functions, are the public face of our country. This is reinforced by the media.

### 2.2.6 Effect of the roles

Because of his unique position, the commander is ideally placed to achieve effects himself. In the roles outlined above, he can play a leading role in his organisation as well as outside the force. In effect, the commander's position and influence are the result of his roles. He is a major player in a large network and, by virtue of his contact with actors at 'his' level, he can exert influence and make a difference. This aspect is also referred to as key leader engagement.

The term 'key leader engagement' underlines the importance of a liaison network with the principal authorities and organisations, including their main representatives and leaders, that play a key role in the conflict. The aim of key leader engagement is to persuade local leaders to support the operation. The preparation and planning of responsibilities in this area must take priority during the first planning phase of an operation.

The commander must realise, however, that other actors are not his subordinates and that he does not always play a pivotal role in the solving of problems.



## 2.3 The commander as a decision maker

The various roles of the commander as described above come together in the decision making. His activities as a decision maker consist of providing *direction* for staff and subordinate commanders, discussion and *consultation* with relevant actors, *consideration* of recommendations and guidelines and the ultimate *decision making*<sup>24</sup> and *execution*.

The first step a commander must take is to determine the nature of the decision required and the amount of time available for the decision-making process. He must then provide his staff and subordinate commanders with enough direction to start the activities which will enable him to make a timely and high-quality decision.

During the decision-making process, available time permitting, the commander will focus mainly on consultation with relevant actors. This *consultation* will be horizontal as well as vertical (both upwards and downwards).

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The commander's horizontal consultation will be directed first and foremost at his own staff and advisers, the senior national representatives of the troop-supplying nations in his unit or formation and the relevant non-military organisations in his area of responsibility.

The upward consultation involves the higher operational and strategic command levels. Consultation will ensure that the commander is fully aware of the intentions of his higher commander and vice versa. Good consultation will benefit unity of opinion and will help the commander to define the context of his task and the often complex problems he faces. Where necessary, the commander will request additional guidelines. In some cases, consultation is required with the highest (even political) levels.

Downward consultation will involve subordinate commanders in the decision making. This ensures that the lower levels will be able to take part in the decision making and creates a sense of 'ownership'. Consultation will also ensure that the commander's decisions are understood.

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<sup>24</sup> Zie ook Allied Joint Publication 01(C): *direction, consultation, consideration en decision*.

Before a commander reaches his decision, he will have to consider the input of his subordinate commanders and the findings and recommendations from his staff, as well as taking into account the outcome of consultations with the higher level, if that has been possible. His own opinion, based on knowledge, experience and intuition, will play an important role in his consideration.

Eventually, the commander himself will make a *decision* and communicate it clearly and concisely. He must then ensure that his decision is communicated as he intended and that the decision is implemented and *executed* correctly. He will decide what he can delegate to whom. A commander may delegate some of his authority, but he retains the ultimate responsibility.

The determining factor for all stages is the point at which the decision has to be made and that moment must be fixed during the direction phase. The steps described above will almost always overlap and will be conducted more often in parallel than in succession. Consultation and consideration may be so interwoven that decisions are made on the spot. In virtually all cases, the decision will be based on incomplete information. Risk is inevitable, because waiting for a complete picture of all relevant factors would lead to operational paralysis. The risk can be reduced by identifying essential information requirements, both generic and specific, as early as possible, either prior to or in direct support of the deployment.

## 2.4 The deputy commander

It is impossible to expect that a commander will be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It is also impossible for him to be in several places at once. In those situations, a competent deputy is required. The commander and his deputy must keep each other fully informed and must trust each other implicitly. The staff and the subordinate commanders must be able to count on the fact that both have the same aims, hold the same opinions and speak the same language. Although there will usually be a division of focal areas between the commander and his deputy, the commander will remain ultimately responsible. It is often the case, for example, that the deputy concentrates mainly on internal affairs and the commander focuses on external matters.

## 2.5 The commander's authority

The commander has the authority to issue orders to units and individuals. This is, however, confined to personnel or units assigned to his command, or over whom he has been given specific authority. The commander has no formal authority over those actors who are not under his command. The commander will normally endeavour to formally establish the relationship, the authority and the mutual responsibilities, which will benefit unity of command and unity of effort.

A common understanding of the various relationships between commanders and units is essential for effective collaboration in a multinational command structure. The definitions of the relationships indicate the level of authority and power held by the commander in respect of his attached unit or capability. The allocated authority, expressed in a command or support relationship, must facilitate the execution of the operational assignment. Command and support relationships could be temporary and localised in nature and may change during the operation. One should be aware of the implications of an (interim) allocation of or a change to a command relationship in terms of equipment, procedures and personnel<sup>25</sup>.

### 2.5.1 Command relationships

Command authority is the power granted to a commander to issue orders and instructions to attached units and is a logical element in the hierarchical structure of a military organisation. The authority is set out in a command relationship. There are seven types of command relationship: full command (FULLCOM), operational command (OPCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical command (TACOM), tactical control (TACON), administrative control (ADCON) and logistic control (LOGCON). There is also coordinating authority (CA) and the term which gives permission for mutual harmonisation, direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH). Annex 2.1 examines this in more detail and sets out what each command relationship entails. Each of these relationships sets parameters for the commander's specific powers.

### 2.5.2 Support relationships: supported and supporting roles

In order to be able to satisfy the operational requirements in the mission area with the available, often scarce assets, use is made of what are known as support relationships, whereby a commander is designated to support, protect or reinforce another commander

<sup>25</sup> Changes in command relationships can have an effect on the military functions, such as a change in logistic relations and the flow of intelligence. One must also ensure that command support is geared to the allocation of extra assets. A change, interim or otherwise, of relationship requires time and preparation. To be able to make active use of an assigned unit or capacity, one should be familiar with its capabilities and limitations. Training is the right means for this.

for a particular period of time. Support relationships help to ensure that the strengths and capabilities of headquarters and units complement each other and lead to greater effectiveness (synergy). Components and units within a force can provide or receive support for the execution of a specific task. Subordinate commanders can act as supporting and supported commanders at the same time, provided the tasks and activities to which these roles apply are clearly defined.

The supported-supporting relationship is not a command relationship, but a relationship imposed by the commander to ensure flexibility in meeting the operational requirement of the supported commander. It is an effective way for the joint commander to articulate his main effort in relation to the desired effects in the various phases of an operation. The allocation of the right support relationships requires focus and close coordination between the joint commander and his subordinate commanders. This applies particularly to the support for the supported commander, whose task it is to accomplish the primary objectives of the joint force. Various supporting and supported commanders can be designated for each of the functions in military operations (manoeuvre, intelligence, etc).

One subordinate commander will normally be made responsible for achieving the main objective of the operation. In that case, that commander will be the supported commander in all activities (military functions) associated with the accomplishment of that objective. The supported commander is authorised in that situation to give general direction for the support activities.

A support relationship is very much a two-way process. The supported commander must be able to participate and comment if required during the development of the supporting commander's plans. The supporting commander must have a full understanding of the order, the assigned tasks and the intent of the supported commander to allow him flexibility in meeting the latter's requirement. By reverse, it is vital that the supported commander is aware of the capabilities and limitations of the supporting commander's capacities.

#### 2.5.2.1 *Supported commander*

The supported commander is responsible for the execution of the tasks assigned to him by the joint commander and the direction of the support to be provided. The supported commander must allow the supporting commander as much freedom of movement as possible in the planning and execution of his operations. Coordination only takes place if necessary, and it is always the supported commander who sets the priorities and determines the desired effects.

The supported commander's level of authority must be specified in the joint commander's operational directives. The directive must indicate the intent and the scope of the support relationship, in any case stating the aim, the time, the place and the duration of the support, the priority of the support in respect of the supporting commander's other orders and the supporting commander's right to deviate from his support task in the event of exceptional circumstances.

#### 2.5.2.2 *Supporting commander*

The supporting commander is responsible for satisfying the requirement of the supported commander. He will have to deploy the necessary troops and capabilities to provide the required reinforcement and support. For this, the supporting commander will advise on the capabilities and limitations of the available capacities and on the prioritisation in respect of conflicting support tasks.

#### 2.5.3 **Other relationships**

Within the military organisation, the internal relationships between commanders are officially established on the basis of command relationships, coordinating authority and support relationships. The effectiveness of the relationships will, however, also be affected by relations between the commanders themselves. Good personal and informal relations are essential, and transparency in the exchange of information and consultations will foster mutual understanding and confidence in each other's abilities. And if this is the case within the military organisation, then it is even more relevant in relations with non-military actors, where there are normally no formal relationships. Mutual trust is the key to unity of effort and informal and personal relations are essential to be able to reach agreements. By analogy with the military command relationships, here it is a matter of 'handshake control'; the handshake is the confirmation of the agreement.

## 2.6 **C2 in a multinational context**

The Netherlands armed forces must at all times be ready to operate in a multinational context with familiar and sometimes less familiar partners. Netherlands military personnel may be appointed as commanders of multinational units or as commanders of national units within a larger multinational force. They may also work in multinational staffs at various levels. Although multinational operations have their advantages, they also give rise to problems which, if unresolved, could have a negative impact on military effectiveness.

C2 in a multinational environment is often more time-consuming than that in a purely national context. Undesired effects on the timeliness or quality of decisions and their



implementation could be reduced by the use of joint doctrines and procedures, realistic training and frequent consultation. Multinational C2 requires a positive international attitude.

#### **2.6.1 National restrictions and conditions (caveats)**

The nature and size of a contribution made by nations to the force will be determined by the national interests of those taking part in the multinational operation. Individual countries never fully transfer authority for their troops to the multinational commander; they will retain a certain degree of control regarding the (operational) deployment themselves. The degree of control is set out in standard command relationships. In addition, nations may formulate specific restrictions on and conditions for the deployment of their troops; these are known as caveats. The number and nature of the caveats largely determine the operational effectiveness. Commanders of multinational structures must be as well informed as possible about any restrictions on the deployment of their attached troops.

Any such restrictions will be particularly important in the use of force and the level of force protection. Individual countries differ in terms of opinion, policy and priority with regard to the protection of their own troops. Within a multinational structure, the different views on force protection must be brought into line in a joint approach in order to prevent a situation in which opponents are able to exploit any differences.

### 2.6.2 Trust

Mutual trust is essential for C2 and commanders and staff officials play a major (model) role in this respect. Mutual trust is based on a number of principles; these do not guarantee success, but failure to pursue them could lead to a lack of unity of opinion.

- *Good relations.* Commanders should strive to achieve good mutual relations. The quality of the personal relations between military leaders affects all aspects of multinational cooperation.
- *Respect.* Mutual respect for professional qualities as well as for the culture, religion, norms and values of all members of the coalition will strengthen internal relations.
- *Knowledge about the partners.* In multinational operations, it is just as important to know about the (deployment) capabilities of the coalition partners as it is to know about those of the opponent. It is worthwhile for commanders to invest time in understanding each other's doctrine, capabilities, ambitions and intentions
- *Patience.* It takes time to achieve effective cooperation. Patience is needed to bridge differences in opinion and insight in order to bring about a targeted and unambiguous approach in the operation.

It is the responsibility of the operational commander to forge together the different elements of a multinational unit. This requires patience, tact and a feeling for politics. There is no room for prejudice or preconceived ideas, even though countries often have different motives for taking part in an operation. An understanding of relative strengths and weaknesses (contingent capabilities) and national political motives and perspectives is essential, as is a sense of the effect of participation in previous missions on the national perception. These factors are often instrumental in determining the issue of national caveats. It is the task of the commander to achieve a balance in the deployment of his units, taking account of their various qualities and national restrictions. The extent to which mission command can be applied will, for instance, differ for each country. The commander must also ensure a fair distribution of burden and risk. Disproportionate risk or excessive praise could adversely effect the cohesion within a multinational unit.

The basis for cooperation will be laid before the mission through contacts, liaison and exchange officers. The operational commander must also make every possible effort to discuss specific military problems on an individual basis with government officials and

senior officers of the troop-supplying nations, who will be active in the joint operations area (JOA).

### 2.6.3 Culture

The joint multinational commander will in practice have spent much of his career in his 'own' country and service and he will inevitably have been shaped by the culture of his own military environment. His style of leadership will also have been developed on the basis of the specific requirements of his own Service and he will have a better knowledge of the capabilities and characteristics of the unit in which he has worked for years. While it is true that education and training are becoming increasingly 'joint' in nature, the emphasis still lies first and foremost on the ability to function in one's own organisation. And that is logical, as people need the solid basis of their own professionalism to be able to operate effectively in a joint environment, where it is all about the synergy generated by bringing together the best capabilities.

In stressful situations, there may be a tendency to revert to familiar patterns and structures (comfort zone) which are unfamiliar to others and which could give rise to incomprehension or confusion. Commanders must be aware of this, as should their staff and subordinate commanders, who are subject to the same reflexes, and must adapt accordingly.

## 2.7 Contingent commander<sup>26</sup> or Senior National Representative (SNR)

### 2.7.1 Role of the contingent commander/SNR

In a multinational force, the commander must be mindful of the commanders of national contingents, who will be representing the troop-supplying nations in the mission area. In the case of smaller contingents, this will usually be a senior national representative (SNR).

Contingent commanders may form an active part of the force's C2 structure, whereby they also hold an international position, with the accompanying authority, and act as the contingent commander at the same time. This will usually be the case with relatively small contingents. In most cases, the contingent commander/SNR will not hold an international function in the chain of command. Physically, the contingent commander will normally find himself near to the combined joint force commander (JFC) in the mission area.

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<sup>26</sup> The contingent commander is known internationally as the National Contingent Commander (NCC).



Although the contingent commander's role and powers differ to those of the international commander, he should be as familiar as possible with the nature and context of the operation in order to be able to provide effective advice and support.

The role of a contingent commander is to integrate the contingent from the country he represents into the joint combined force. He will endeavour to achieve cohesion, trust and understanding, while at the same time monitoring and, where necessary, implementing national directives and caveats. The contingent commander represents the troop-contributing nation and is the communication channel to his country in respect of, for example, operational developments, incidents, force protection and support, and media issues.

The contingent commander is responsible for monitoring and implementing national caveats. If he is at a high level and there are more commanders from that country in the various components of the force, the contingent commander may delegate certain aspects of the caveats. This will enable any problems to be resolved at a lower level, thus minimising the impact on cohesion. It is extremely important that matters which could cause friction in the execution of the operation as a result of national caveats or directives be discussed with the multinational commander at the earliest possible opportunity in order to reach a satisfactory solution. In the worst case, the contingent commander/SNR could

use his authority as a 'red card holder' and block the deployment of the national contingent proposed by the multinational commander.

### **2.7.2 Tasks of the contingent commander/SNR**

Broadly speaking, the contingent commander's tasks include the following.

- Coordination and collaboration with operational commanders and other contingent commanders to ensure unity of opinion and establish a sound (liaison) network.
- To ensure the national administrative and logistic support for his own troops necessary to achieve and maintain their operational readiness.
- To advise the multinational commander on the specific capacities, capabilities and limitations of his troops.
- Where necessary, to block the deployment of the national contingent proposed by the multinational commander (red card holder function).
- To keep the national authorities informed of the situation in the mission area and of any developments which could lead to a change in the concept of operations, changes in the required assets or in the way in which the task is to be performed.
- To make provisions in the intelligence structure to integrate national contributions into the multinational commander's intelligence position.
- To harmonise national CIS systems with other components and contingents.
- To implement directives with regard to public information and the media.

### **2.7.3 National direction**

When Netherlands troops take part in (international) military operations, the CHOD will be represented. Depending on the size of the Netherlands contribution, this will be done by either a contingent commander or an SNR. Unlike the contingent commander, the SNR will not always have his own staff.

The mission, the participating units and local conditions will determine the composition and the rank level of the functions within the contingent command. For his national role, the contingent commander or SNR will be governed directly by the CHOD<sup>27</sup>.

The powers of the contingent commander/SNR differ from those of the operational commanders. The contingent commander/SNR has no authority over the operational units other than that of 'red card holder'. To prevent 'dual management', it is vital that the Netherlands operational commander(s) and the contingent commander/SNR coordinate their tasks and powers in a process known as mutual adjustment. In accordance with the basic principles of military operations, operational units must be under a single command. If the situation is unclear, the CHOD, or the Director of Operations on his behalf, may exact the necessary clarity.

## 2.8 Mission command

The Netherlands bases its style of command on four guiding principles. First of all, there must be a clear understanding through the entire chain of command of the higher commander's intent (what he wants to achieve, why and, in broad terms, how). Secondly, the subordinates are obliged to actively pursue that intent. The third principle is the importance of good and timely decisions, and the last is the commander's determination to bring the plan to a successful conclusion. This approach requires a style of command which encourages decentralisation and which allows freedom of action at lower levels, thus enabling speed of action and initiative. At the same time, this style must remain open to direction from higher levels, particularly where the deployment of scarce assets and capabilities is concerned. In the Netherlands armed forces<sup>28</sup>, mission command (*opdrachtgerichte commandovoering, Auftragstaktik*) is the preferred method of implementing these four principles.

Successful mission command is based on a number of conditions:

- the commander must ensure that subordinate commanders actually understand not only his intent, but also the orders they have received and the context in which they have to operate;

<sup>27</sup> For a detailed description of the Netherlands approach in respect of the SNR/NCC, see CHOD Directives A-300 and 320.

<sup>28</sup> And also in NATO (AJP-01, 2007).

- it must be made clear to subordinate commanders what effects they have to achieve and where they are needed, and there must be sufficient assets available to carry out the assignment;
- commanders exercise a minimum of control over their subordinate commanders, in accordance with their experience and capabilities, although the commander does remain responsible for the actions of his subordinates;
- subordinate commanders make their own decisions regarding the best way to perform their task.

Within the concept of mission command, the balance between decentralisation and centralisation merits particular attention. A commander may decide on a low level of decentralisation and retain a high level of control himself, or he may be forced to do so by, for instance, the short supply of certain assets or capabilities. By doing so, he will reduce his own level of uncertainty (in any event, it will allow him to respond to that uncertainty by deploying reserves and issuing orders). He could also decide to delegate responsibility and authority for decision making to his subordinate commanders. While that will reduce his own ability to influence events directly, it will also reduce uncertainty at lower levels and boost the ability of his subordinates to anticipate and react to direct opportunities themselves.

The extent to which and the manner in which a commander can apply mission command depends on several factors which affect freedom of action and the degree of decentralisation.

- The authority vested in the commander. If the allocated freedom of action is limited, this will also work through to lower levels.
- The quantity and number of assets available. A short supply of assets will usually lead to greater centralisation. This applies particularly in the case of air power.
- The nature and (political) sensitivity of the activities to be conducted in the campaign.
- Task maturity of the commander and subordinates. There will be more delegation and freedom in the case of experienced (subordinate) commanders who have worked with each other frequently and have a good understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations than there will be in the case of less experienced commanders.

- The nature of the physical operational environment. A relatively surveyable environment will usually offer greater scope for centralised control.
- Commander's personal style.
- The extent of multinationality and collaboration with non-military actors.
- The prevailing culture in individual services and within countries. Variations in the style of command between the services are usually the result of assets, history, doctrine and the prevailing physical environment. Those differences also exist between nations.

Operations are often chaotic and the outcome is usually unpredictable. While technology can be useful if it enables the commander and his troops to react swiftly, much will still depend on the judgement of those who are removed just far enough from the chaos to see things clearly. Military activities, particularly the manoeuvrist approach<sup>29</sup>, require freedom of action so that commanders have the authority to actually act in accordance with the higher commander's intent as soon as an unforeseen situation arises.

Generally speaking, control measures should restrict the freedom of action as little as possible. A lack of certainty or clarity at any given time during the operation could prompt the commander to opt for more rather than less control. It may also be necessary for the higher commander to intervene in order to exploit opportunities or reduce risks that have not been identified by subordinate commanders. The commander must, however, remain aware at all times that unnecessary intervention could lead to a culture of dependence and risk-avoidance on the part of subordinate commanders.

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<sup>29</sup> The manoeuvrist approach is the main method used in the conduct of operations by NATO and the Netherlands. "The Manoeuvrist Approach focuses on shattering the adversary's overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel. It is an **indirect** approach, which emphasizes targeting the enemy's moral component of fighting power rather than the physical. The approach involves a combination of lethal and non-lethal means to achieve effects which shape an adversary's understanding, undermine his will and shatter his cohesion. It aims to apply strength against identified vulnerabilities. Significant features are momentum, tempo and agility, which in combination lead to shock and surprise. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a relentless determination to succeed. It is applicable to all types of military activities across the spectrum of conflict" (AJP-o1(c), 2007).



## 2.9 Leadership

### 2.9.1 General

In general terms, leadership refers to those activities designed to influence the behaviour of others to perform the mission properly. Leadership is the projection of the personality and character of an individual, usually the commander, to motivate troops to do what is expected of them. The possession of leadership skills is one of the prime qualities a commander needs to exercise his command; it is an extremely important precondition for achieving a unit's success at all levels of operation. There is no formula for leadership. It is not only the commander who leads; other officials involved in the command also provide leadership to personnel and (parts of) the command process. This applies in particular to key officials such as the deputy commander, the chief of staff, deputy or assistant chiefs and section heads.

### 2.9.2 Leadership qualities

The way in which a commander leads his unit largely determines the extent to which that unit functions successfully. The ability to exercise command requires a combination of conceptual and human qualities, supplemented by a number of personal skills, one of which is without doubt the ability to communicate effectively. The quality of leadership will determine the quality of the command. It is the commander who ensures the execution of a mission by conveying action, motivation and energy, the will to “go for it”, to his personnel. For effective command, the commander’s location is extremely important. He will position himself at a point from which he can have a decisive effect on the military action. He must be able to see and be seen as far as operational conditions allow; his staff should not form a barrier between himself and his unit.

Despite the simplicity of the underlying principles, the practical application of command is not straightforward. Commanders must be able to be flexible and adaptable when using their knowledge and experience, and that requires a high level of professionalism and skill. Qualities such as intuition, originality and initiative, intelligence and vision, self-confidence and determination are also essential.

Intuition is based on extensive experience and can considerably shorten an otherwise laborious rational analysis. In peacetime, this can be achieved through frequent exercises in the military thought process. That should generate the right feeling for – and the right appreciation of – the dynamic cohesion of the numerous factors of influence and also encourage pattern recognition. Intuition forms the basis of the ability to judge quickly and incisively in order to discern the most important and decisive elements in a great multitude of facts and situations. Anything less relevant and of secondary importance will be disregarded immediately, while the most urgent and important issues will be swiftly identified.

Commanders cannot always receive optimum support from their own staff. A staff will normally approach problems in a rational manner, so that the best solution can be sought objectively. This is not always in keeping with the commander’s intuition and judgement, which is difficult to explain to a staff in a short space of time. Inexperienced commanders sometimes need to be more persuasive with their staff than do experienced commanders who have already built up a reputation for success.

Originality and initiative are necessary to exploit opportunities, perform surprise actions and maintain a high tempo. Successful commanders are often those who are not afraid to take risks and have a slight tendency to challenge the established rules,

also in non-operational situations. It is these very characteristics which make them ideal for dictating the operational environment and scoring points off the opponent. This attitude is, however, often at odds with what is usually organisationally or politically desirable in non-operational circumstances.

Intelligence and vision are essential to be able to understand – and come up with solutions for – complex problems. At higher levels especially, commanders must be able to judge non-measurable variables. Examples of these could be the sometimes unspoken wishes of political masters (whom the commander often knows personally), an assessment of emotions, the expected responses of allies and opponents and the counter-moves the opponent could be expected to take. As well as the clearly visible factors of influence, commanders must have a feeling for the invisible and actual situation in the mission area.

Self-confidence is essential to a commander and he must possess it in sufficient measure to be able to listen constructively to the ideas of his staff and his subordinates without the fear of losing his authority. This dialogue will demonstrate that the commander does not already have all the answers and is receptive to good ideas. It will help to build mutual trust and respect between the commander and his subordinates. A good commander cannot, however, rely solely on the creativity and insight of others; he must possess these qualities himself. He must have the ability to use the ideas of others to form and evaluate his own opinions.

Determination is necessary to perform actions. Lower command levels require a great deal of robustness and perseverance in the execution of their (combat) activities, in the course of which troops will face a combination of physical and mental hardship, stress, danger and death. At higher levels, that direct confrontation will often be less applicable. On the other hand, however, the combination of uncertainty and the responsibility for life and death can produce a mental burden of a different sort. In the often confused conditions of an operation, incoming information could be false or exaggerated. One of the effects of fear is increased inaccuracy and exaggeration. People under strain also tend to believe bad news rather than good news and to make the bad news worse when they transmit it to others. In such circumstances, commanders must trust their intuition and judgement and remain rock-steady. This is no mean feat and requires experience and a naturally optimistic outlook.

Determination and perseverance are even more important if the success of the military action is not immediately visible to others, such as higher commanders and politicians, or to the commander's own staff and subordinates.

Even though at the higher strategic-operational level the problems may seem straightforward because of the abstraction layer, that does not mean that execution will also be easy. It takes more nerve to make an important strategic-operational decision than it does to make a tactical decision. When making a tactical decision, the commander is swept along, as it were, by the pressure of the moment and the need to decide. In the case of a strategic-operational decision, the tempo is normally slower. There is often enough time to form an opinion, for himself and for others, to listen to objections and even to regret any partially implemented decisions. But in a strategic-operational environment, determination is required to avoid becoming entangled in a web of conflicting interests and contradictory advice.

The work of a commander is wide-ranging and demanding. In the operational environment of active deployment, a commander's scope of activity is virtually limitless, much more so than is the case in the peacetime organisation. To be able to lead military personnel under extremely difficult circumstances and still achieve success is a great source of satisfaction.

Every good plan needs a commander who will ensure that it is executed, adapted and carried through. Determination is required to persevere with the plan and not deviate from the original course. At the same time, a clear head is needed to make timely adjustments, especially in conditions of great (personal) uncertainty and psychological strain. Intelligence alone is not enough. Tenacity, intuition, vision, originality, initiative and certainly courage and bravery are also the qualities of a good commander. He must also be able to view all aspects calmly and be analytical by nature; he must be prepared to adjust a plan, but not on the basis of any bad news that comes his way.

However difficult the role of a commander may be, a successful operation ultimately comes down to the skill of responding to the opportunities that arise. The point is to use the expertise and skills described above to act faster than the opponent, with a higher-quality output. Command has to do with the individual, and different circumstances call for different commanders. There is, after all, no unique formula or combination of qualities that will guarantee success. However important a commander's personal qualities may be, he will ultimately be judged by his actions. An operational commander must have the trust of his superiors and his subordinates and, in the case of a multinational force, the coalition partners in order to be able to perform his task.

## CHOD Vision on Leadership (2007)

To provide leadership is to consciously direct the behaviour and to inspire others to work together to achieve the chosen objective. To consciously direct behaviour goes far beyond simply issuing orders; a leader is not only responsible for the execution of the assigned tasks, but also for all the personnel and equipment assigned to him. The task of directing behaviour is a well-considered, continuous process, whereby the leader, mindful of the task and the higher commander's intent, leads, coaches and supports the members of his team and allows them to perform their assigned tasks independently.

Inspiration is all about motivating and stimulating staff. It starts with the assumption of responsibility and the provision of clear information, but above all it means convincingly setting a good example in terms of attitude and conduct. Obviously, accomplishing the chosen objective together primarily means carrying out the given task and achieving the desired result. In this respect, it is important that the team members can identify with the chosen objective and are involved as much as possible in deciding how it is to be achieved. Within the set parameters, they must be given as much room as possible in respect of the way in which they conduct their own task in the context of the common objective.

Leadership in the defence organisation is based primarily on the models of *situational leadership* and *motivational leadership*. Situational leadership is based on the premise that a form of leadership can only be effective if it is in keeping with the competence and involvement of those being led. That is why we must on the one hand be able to respond to the various strong and weak points of the individual and, on the other, to the circumstances in which tasks and assignments have to be conducted. In other words, a balance must always be sought, under changing circumstances, between task-oriented and people-oriented leadership. Everything revolves around the right combination of leading, coaching, supporting and delegating. Leadership is, therefore, more than just management! Leadership is developing, motivating, demonstrating and giving confidence. In this respect, motivational leadership can be regarded as the ability to release one's own potential as well as that of others to establish new opportunities for the team. In motivational leadership, the tone of the communication, the ability to listen and to inspire confidence and the joint mission are the key factors.

The following core values provide guidance for us as leaders:

**'FAIR AND CLEAR'** We tell our people clearly what needs to happen and why. We have a clear vision and we convey that. We act with integrity and try to set a good example to our staff. We are fair and transparent. We are able to identify mistakes, but we accept our people for who they are.

**'COURAGEOUS'** We dare to take risks for the purpose of our mission and for our team. This applies in an administrative or organisational setting as well as in dangerous operational conditions. We stand before our people and we are not afraid to show our vulnerability. We are not afraid to express our opinions and we respect those of others. We want to learn from mistakes that are made.

**'EMPATHY AND CONNECTION'** We are genuinely interested in others and we listen to our staff. We give them time, appreciation and trust. We encourage the personal development of our staff and we provide a safe working environment. We work actively to achieve a strong and varied team.

**'HELPFUL'** We are helpful to our team and in our task. We are not afraid to delegate and we give our staff room to act and to learn from their mistakes. We are not inflexible.

**'INSPIRING'** We give off energy and optimism and we take initiative. We believe in Defence and in our organisation. We want to share this passion with others and we convey that desire. We can cope with disappointment and we are aware of our own qualities and areas which need attention. We do not avoid awkward questions and we are willing to work on our own development.

**'AUTHENTIC'** Each individual is unique. This vision will guide the day-to-day functioning, but will also provide room for individual styles of leadership. Being yourself is extremely important for our acceptance as leaders within the organisation. It is impossible to provide leadership without the acceptance of those receiving it. The development of those receiving leadership into involved and analytical recipients is, therefore, highly important. Leaders also receive orders and instructions; a good leader is, therefore, one who is also able to accept leadership himself.

## 3. Staff and support

### 3.1 Introduction

Command support, also known as the command and control system, is the entirety of personnel, organisation (structure), equipment and (communications) infrastructure that supports C2. As well as assets, the processes and procedures also play a major role. This chapter looks successively at the staff, staff personnel and the possible organisational forms the staff could take and discusses the various types of headquarters. Although the main focus is on the operational level, the same principles also apply to staffs and headquarters at tactical levels.



### 3.2 Main tasks of the staff

The main tasks of the staff are:

- to support the commander in his command, in both the preparation and the execution stage;
- to create and maintain the conditions necessary for the execution of the mission;
- to keep the staffs of higher and lower commanders informed.

The staff's products consist of recommendations to the commander, plans, functional tasks and directives on behalf of the commander, information to lower staffs and reports to higher staffs.

To be able to perform these tasks, staff officials must collect, analyse and coordinate essential information on a continuous basis.

A staff must at all times have an understanding of the situation, the opportunities, the risks and the capabilities and limitations of its sub-units, and of the support that could be provided by adjacent or higher units. Equally important is information about the capabilities and limitation of other, non-military actors. This information, together with recommendations and advice, must be submitted promptly to the commander, allowing sufficient reaction time for additional decision making.

### 3.3 Organisation of the staff

The staff has a generic composition, organisation and work method, which enables the exchange of personnel between units and collaboration with other staffs. From a generic model, the staff can be adapted to the commander's vision or to the mission characteristics. The commander or chief of staff will often choose a function-based organisation. His other option would be for a process-based organisation. The structure and size of the staff will normally be determined by the complexity of the operation rather than by the size of the force under command.

The staff's work method is usually set out in its own Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Standard Operating Instructions (SOI). These translate general principles into a specific situation which is dependent on the capacities that are actually available.

#### **Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)**

These are sets of procedures with compulsory instructions for the planning and execution of military actions, designed to maintain the necessary consistency and standardisation. SOPs are often based on practical experience. They provide information for officials from outside the unit and are thus externally focused. SOPs inform attached individuals and units about the way of working within a unit. Lastly, they serve as a teaching aid for unit training and instruction.

#### **Standard Operating Instructions (SOI)**

These are sets of detailed instructions drawn up on the basis of the SOPs. SOIs give practical and often highly peremptory directives for specific situations or the specific execution of staff processes, and are intended solely for internal use.

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### **3.3.1 Organisational models**

Generally speaking, there are several variants for establishing a staff organisation.

#### *3.3.1.1 Organisation according to function*

With this structure, which forms the basis of any organic structure, the activities are organised according to an organisation's established function-based specialisms. This structure corresponds to the existing J-structure used by Netherlands and international staffs.

#### *3.3.1.2 Organisation according to geographical region*

This structure, according to, for example, province or country, is commonplace. The geographical division of NATO headquarters or the subdivision of the Netherlands into Regional Military Commands are good examples of this variant.

#### *3.3.1.3 Organisation according to target groups*

With a structure based on target groups (a 'market'), the idea is that different groups and actors should be approached in different ways. Certain elements might, for example, focus on a single actor or group of actors, such as government representatives and rulers, population or media.

#### 3.3.1.4 *Organisation according to products, capabilities or services*

This type of structure incorporates in a single organisational unit all the disciplines required to supply a particular group of products and services. The subdivision of Defence into operational commands (army, air force, navy and Marechaussee) or NATO component commands falls into this category.

#### 3.3.1.5 *Matrix or project organisation*

In practice, these organic structures rarely exist in their pure form. The matrix organisation, in which specialists from different departments are put together to work on one or more projects, is the rule rather than the exception. If such a collaboration takes on a more permanent nature, it becomes known as a matrix or project organisation. The regular work will be done in the individual departments.

#### 3.3.1.6 *Network organisation*

A network organisation is an implicit or explicit collaborative structure characterised by semi-stable relations between autonomous organisations and/or individuals. Relations are established for a relatively limited time, wherever and whenever required for the execution of a specific activity, and are broken again afterwards. The making and breaking of relations is characterised by a relatively high degree of autonomy. The network organisation can thus be regarded as a special variant of the matrix organisations, whereby a high level of autonomy and self-synchronisation is taken as read.

#### 3.3.1.7 *From vertical to horizontal*

The organisational structure cannot be seen in isolation from the process structure. A process is a chain of logically ordered, result-oriented activities. Each process is built up of five elements: results (final or as input for other processes), activities, people, equipment and frameworks (conditions, requirements, plans).

The way of thinking in military organisation structures is mainly vertical, whereby the organogram and the hierarchy take precedence over the intended result. When additional tasks are introduced, inflexible structures generally result because of the increased number of management layers. Personnel operate within the confines of their organisational element with the primary focus on the task to be performed rather than the overall result to be achieved. Use of the process concept that advocates horizontal organisation overcomes parochialism, since the focus is shifted to thinking in terms of the (end) result). Generally speaking, this will result in a more dynamic structure and a flatter organisation. If the process so requires, personnel will be deployed in varying multidisciplinary teams.

### 3.3.1.8 No standard solution

There are in effect no staff structures which are purely function-based or process-based. Neither is there a one-size-fits-all solution. Prior to a deployment, the commander will have to decide on the staff structure and composition he requires, taking account of the pros and cons of each of the options. The way the staff is set up must also comply as fully as possible with the principles of command as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.9.

A certain amount of mutual recognizability is required for the purpose of interoperability. For officials who start working in a larger staff, it is important that the structural elements and work patterns are recognizable so that they are able, with the help of the specific instructions that apply to that staff (SOP, SOI), to find their feet quickly and can thus contribute to the quality of the staff.

## 3.4 Function-based organisation

One of the most familiar organisational models for a staff is the traditional function-based model, according to area of expertise. Although there are several models, the function-based structure is the most common and usually also forms the basis from which other models are derived. The function-based areas of expertise are usually divided into (staff) sections: personnel (1), intelligence (2), operations (3), logistics (4), plans (5), CIS (6), training (7), finance (8) and CIMIC (9).




Figure 3-1: 'Function-based organisation'

In a joint force staff, the different staff elements are designated with the letter 'J', followed by the number indicating the function. If the joint staff is also multinational, these become CJ (combined joint) staff elements<sup>30</sup>. In smaller (tactical) staffs, a staff section will often consist of a few individuals; in large staffs, each section could comprise dozens of people. More and more often, representatives of civil actors can also be incorporated in the staff structure.

Depending on the level and the size of the staff, the staff sections – often referred to as staff divisions or directorates in the case of larger staffs – are divided further into specialisations. The primary sections have staff responsibility for the activities, processes and capacities which are directly related to the functions in military operations. The staff sections provide expertise and experience for the planning, decision making, execution and evaluation of operations. Depending on the mission and the circumstances, additional special staff sections may be created, such as an engineer or special operations section.

The staff is led by the chief of staff (COS). In order to reduce the chief of staff's span of control, the various staff sections in larger staffs are often grouped according to their contribution to the process. In that case, a group of staff sections will be led by a deputy chief of staff (DCOS). The DCOS Operations leads the staff activities focused on the realisation of effects (J2, J3, J5) during the operation. The DCOS Support leads all staff activities related to supporting and maintaining the operation. Depending on its size and nature, the staff section's head is referred to as chief (e.g. Chief J3) or assistant chief of staff (ACOS).

The structure of the joint military staff will be determined by a great many factors, such as the place in the operation's overall C2 structure, the task, the nature and size of the attached force and the features of the operational environment. It falls to the chief of staff to structure and optimise the staff for the successful planning, execution and support of the operation.

The commander may be supported by special advisers as well as by the functional staff sections referred to above. The staff could include the following specialist staff officers: a public affairs officer (PAO), a legal adviser (LEGAD), a political adviser (POLAD), a cultural or tribal adviser (CULAD, TRIBAD), a development (cooperation) adviser (DEVAD), a medical adviser (chief surgeon, senior medical officer or medical adviser), a chaplain, a provost marshal (PM), a controller, a reporter/recorder and a safety official. In principle, specialist staff officers also fall under the responsibility of the chief of staff.

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<sup>30</sup> In units consisting solely of ground forces, staff sections are labelled with the letter 'G'. Air force staffs use the letter 'A' and naval staffs the letter 'N'.

### 3.4.1 Chief of Staff (COS)

The chief of staff is one of the commander's most important advisers and is responsible for the administration and management of all staff processes. He is the link between the commander and the staff.

The chief of staff will be an experienced serviceman, ideally also with personal experience as a commander, as a result of which he is able to lead and coordinate the work of the staff by setting well-defined priorities and providing clear instructions. He is the most important official for the integration of the work of the joint force's staff as a whole and is the main link between the commander and the staff. The chief of staff is in charge of the staff on a day-to-day basis and is responsible for ensuring that the staff members act as a team. 'Team spirit' is vital and ensures that the staff is more than a large, impersonal organisation, especially in a multinational setting. The chief of staff's main tasks are:

- to coordinate and direct the work of the staff sections;
- to supervise the formulation of plans and orders;
- to set up and monitor the staff's battle rhythm and structure and to create the horizontal teams necessary to support the process;
- to establish staff-wide coordination and to disseminate the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).
- to set up and monitor information management.

### 3.4.2 Personal staff

Usually, commanders at operational level will also have a personal staff which does not fall under the responsibility of the chief of staff. The commander's personal staff (sometimes also referred to as the cabinet) will consist of one or more military assistants or advisers (MA), one or more personal assistants (PA) or aides-de-camp (ADC), drivers and personal security officers. The MA will act as an adviser, coach and 'sounding board', and could have considerable influence on the commander. The PA or ADC is mainly responsible for the commander's personal support.

### 3.4.3 (J1) Personnel and administration

The main role of the J1 staff is to contribute to the decision-making process and to advise the commander on personnel risk management. J1's areas of responsibility cover personnel management and staff support, allocation of entitlements and allowances, morale, recreation and welfare, safety and working environment, administration of prisoners of war and the reporting of casualties and losses. J1 must coordinate with the personnel officials of the national contingents of the troop-supplying nations.

### 3.4.4 (J2) Intelligence

J2 is responsible for supplying the accurate, timely and comprehensive information required by the commander to support the operation. J2 is also responsible for supplying the intelligence requirement for the joint common operational picture (JCOP) within the area of intelligence interest. Above all, J2 ensures the integration of all intelligence throughout the entire C2 process. Lastly, J2 is responsible for leading the joint intelligence centre (JIC) and directing specific collection agencies.

### 3.4.5 (J3) Operations

J3 is the centre from which the execution of the operation is directed. Monitoring and adjustment serves to guarantee unity of effort as well as the most effective deployment of capacities to support ongoing and planned operations. For this, J3 will set up a joint operations centre (JOC). J3 could consist of sections or cells that support domain-specific operations (J3 MARITIME, J3 LAND and J3 AIR) and sections which support special operational activities, such as special operations forces operations (SOFOPS), space operations (SPACEOPS), psychological operations (PSYOPS), CBRN, CIMIC, targeting coordination, refugee support (REFSUP), multinational specialised units operations (MSUOPS) and military police operations (MPOPS). The J3 staff's responsibilities include the following:

- coordination and synchronisation of the execution of the operation;
- monitoring the plans and operations of subordinate components and units;
- setting up the joint operations centre;
- monitoring and assessing the status and capabilities of the attached troops;
- warning in good time if things are not going according to plan so that the commander can make timely adjustments;

- specifying tasks and assignments, based on the joint commander's concept of operations; producing fragmentary orders (FRAGO);
- advising the commander on the use of and possible amendments or additions to the relevant rules of engagement (ROE);
- coordinating and integrating joint fires and targeting activities in the current operation, specifying and coordinating air space management and air space control and setting up cross-functional teams for this purpose;
- coordinating the deployment of liaison officers (LO) who support the contact with other relevant commanders, headquarters and non-military actors, as well as coordinating the activities of all LOs who are appointed to the joint HQ. A special official is normally appointed for this;
- coordinating all reporting activities.

#### 3.4.6 (J4) Logistics

J4 is responsible for advising on the logistic capabilities required to achieve the objective of the operation. J4 must then ensure that these requirements are indeed covered throughout the operation. To this end, J4 will draw up the concept and plans for the logistics and will coordinate the logistic effort. The size and complexity of the operation, the contribution of the troop-supplying nations and the extent to which national and multinational logistics have to be integrated require specialist logistic coordination. If necessary, a multinational joint logistic coordination centre (MJLCC) could be set up to coordinate the domain-specific components, the national support elements (NSEs), the host nation (HN) and other parties.

#### 3.4.7 (J5) Plans

The J5 staff supports the commander in the development of his plan and in the planning for future operations and actions. J5 coordinates the planning activities within its own HQ, with the staffs of higher, adjacent and subordinate commanders and with civil actors. J5 is responsible for setting up a joint operational planning group (JOPG) and supplying its core elements.

J5 may be divided into advance planners and implementation planners. The advance planners focus on the long-term analysis and the resulting products. They concentrate on scenarios, analysis of the politico-military environment, the desired end state and the campaign plan. The implementation planners are the channel between J5 and J3. They focus on the shorter term and initiate and develop plans in response to current or developing situations or crises. The implementation planners receive tasks from J3 and support it in translating operation plans (OPLANs) into actual operation orders (OPORDs). They will continue to support J3 throughout the execution of the operation. Because this group is situated between J3 and J5, the term J3/5 is also used. The activities for which the J5 is responsible include the following.

- establishing, on the basis of as much available information as possible, the (military) conditions for the successful accomplishment of the military objectives;
- campaign planning and the development of one or more courses of action (COA);
- determining criteria for success and the associated measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) on the basis of which the achieved effects and outcomes can be evaluated;
- issuing planning guidelines for the execution of the campaign or operation with particular attention for the demarcation of the areas of operation (AOO) of the components within the JOA, and the synchronisation in time and place of the available capabilities and the effects to be achieved;
- disseminating the commander's decisions on the COA by issuing a concept of operations (CONOPS) and/or an operation plan (OPLAN);
- assessing the accomplishment of the desired effects and outcomes of the campaign and operation, on the basis of operational analysis .<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>31</sup> Specialist operational analysts can be incorporated in J5 for this purpose.

**3.4.8 (J6) Communication and information systems**

The J6 staff is responsible for guaranteeing communication and information systems (CIS) to support the operation and the interoperability of CIS procedures at all levels within the joint force. To establish the joint force's C2 requirement, J6 must be involved in the planning, coordination and implementation of the C2 structure. J6 is normally responsible for the establishment of a specialist element or centre (a joint CIS support centre, for example) to support the management of CIS and networks. J6 also supports the management and supply of information within the staff, but is not responsible for information management; that task lies with the chief of staff's information manager.

**3.4.9 (J7) Training**

J7's task is to advise on and manage all aspects of training. This involves the training of the joint force in the theatre prior to the operation and the organisation of training of new personnel or reinforcements of staffs assigned during an ongoing operation<sup>32</sup>. J7 also ensures that there is liaison with the next rotation in order to guarantee a smooth transition, and also takes care of the transfer of expertise and experience (lessons learned) to the incoming units and staffs. If the operation is time-limited and there are to be no relief forces, or if the training level is such that the J3 staff can manage it alone, or if a particular training phase is not required, a separate J7 may not be required. Where necessary, J7 can be integrated in the JOC as a separate cell.

**3.4.10 (J8) Finance, budgets**

J8, led by a financial controller, is responsible, on behalf of the commander, for drawing up and implementing the joint mission budget for the operation. The J8 also monitors the budgets of subordinate units and headquarters. Because J8 has staff responsibility for local contracting and fiscal matters, it will usually be one of the first to arrive in the area of operations and the last to leave. J8 is in constant and close consultation with troop-supplying countries and the host nation. Other staff sections work with J8 through the intermediary of appointed budget managers to ensure sufficient funding for the mission-related requirements. In some cases, there is no separate J8; the audit function is then allocated to a special staff officer who forms part of another section.

**3.4.11 (J9) CIMIC**

The task of the J9 staff is to advise the commander on the implications of all activities directly involved with relations between the force, the local authorities, the population, international organisations, NGOs and other agencies of the countries in which the force is

<sup>32</sup> Examples: in-theatre training, key leader training.



deployed and supported. J9 personnel themselves do not necessarily have the specialist knowledge and skills relevant to the civil environment. They should, however, have broad military experience and a knowledge of the work methods of IOs and NGOs and of the environment in which the force is operating. J9 must be able to explain the military requirements to civil organisations and vice versa. Another of J9's tasks is to make assessments of the civil situation and to advise the commander accordingly. J9 will normally set up a joint CIMIC centre (JCIMICC).

#### **3.4.12 Engineer**

Although this sometimes forms part of the J3, larger staffs may have a separate engineer section. This engineer staff section will advise the commander on all engineer and construction matters. Although he will not normally be in command of these units, he must have technical and coordinating authority over all engineer assets in the mission area in order to ensure that all assets and capabilities are deployed as effectively as possible. A JF engineer coordination cell (JFECC) will normally be set up in the headquarters for this purpose. Ideally, this will be a separate cell, but if that is not possible, it can be incorporated in the JOC.

#### **3.4.13 Provost marshal**

The provost marshal is the commander's adviser on all matters relating to order, discipline and security within the force, as well as on military police matters. Together with the commander of a multinational support unit (MSU), if there is one, the provost marshal is also responsible for public order and security issues concerning the civil population in the mission area. The provost marshal may also be incorporated in another staff section (J3).

#### **3.4.14 (JMED) Medical**

To ensure good medical planning and support for the attached troops, the commander must have a medical staff structure which advises him about the medical and health situation and supports him in planning and coordinating the deployment of national medical capacities. The staff will include a medical adviser (MEDAD) for this purpose. As a special staff officer, the MEDAD has direct access to the commander with regard to medical and health issues. The MEDAD may also hold the position of the most senior medical authority (senior medical officer, medical director, chief surgeon) in the joint force. In some cases, the medical function forms part of J4 logistics.

### 3.4.15 Information operations (Info Ops)

Information operations involve the coordination of activities in the information domain which aim to influence the will, perception and capability of approved target groups<sup>33</sup>. They also involve activities designed to protect our own freedom of movement within the information domain, to protect friendly information and information processes and to attack information and information systems of a potential adversary. This means that information operations do not in theory have their own capacities, but that they are an integral part of all operational activities. The staff may include a section which facilitates the coordination process and supports other sections in Info Ops.



<sup>33</sup> information operations policy framework, 2007.

### 3.4.16 Public affairs, information and media

The public affairs officer (PAO)<sup>34</sup>, supported by the PA office, advises the commander on all media-related matters, on the basis of the guidelines in the information strategy formulated at the highest politico-military level. To ensure synergy and unity of opinion, the PAO must coordinate closely at all command levels with all other actors in the field of information dissemination and collection, including J3 Info Ops, J3 PSYOPS and J2.

PA activities must also be closely linked to information operations and CIMIC. The PAO ensures the harmonisation of the PA elements of other international organisations (such as the United Nations and the European Union) and actors active in the mission area. The media information centre (MIC) is the interface with the international and local media. The PAO formulates the information strategy and supports the implementation; he is also in principle the joint commander's spokesman and, in that capacity, must have direct access to the commander if necessary. Given that the success and credibility of the spokesman depend on constant contact with the press and on mutual trust, a rapid changeover of spokespersons should be avoided.

### 3.4.17 Political adviser (POLAD)

POLADs are civil servants, often diplomats from a foreign ministry or officials from the international organisation under which the force operates (NATO, for example). The POLAD advised the commander on the following matters:

- local, national, regional and international political affairs;
- political matters and politically sensitive issues related to allies, partners, troop-supplying countries and the host nation;
- relations with international organisations such as the UN and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

### 3.4.18 Legal adviser (LEGAD)

Both civilian and military lawyers may act as legal advisers to the commander. The legal adviser will advise the commander in broad terms on the following:

- international law/legislation and mandates for the mission;

<sup>34</sup> Many publications use the term 'public information' (PI). PA has been the widely accepted term in NATO since 2007 (MC 0457/1, 19 September 2007, Military policy on Public Affairs).

- the legal aspects of the use of force and the rules of engagement (ROE);
- legal aspects relating to allies, partners, troop-supplying states and the host nation;
- all legal matters ensuing from the physical presence of the joint force on foreign territory (status of forces agreements, memoranda of understanding, technical agreements).

#### 3.4.19 Information management

Information management forms the bridge between information infrastructure (with the data and information stored within it) and the information users who have specific requirements and translate the information into usable input for the decision making. Information management is one of a staff's core activities and a clear information management structure is indispensable. The structure must in any event contain a senior information officer (SIO) and an information manager (IM). The SIO is, on behalf of the commander, the owner of the information within the organisation and as such responsible for the origin and quality of the information produced. In many cases, the chief of staff will act as the SIO. The IM works for the SIO and is responsible for the processes which facilitate the supply of information within the organisation. In large staffs, it is sometimes necessary to structure and formalise the harmonisation between the information producers, the information users and the IMs under the SIO's leadership. This would then be referred to as an information management cell (IMC) or board (IMB).

### 3.5 Horizontal team structures

As referred to earlier, there are other variants available to military organisations besides the function-based staff structure. The division into vertical, function-based pillars ensures that specialist knowledge is massed, secured and optimised within the specialist functional area. The disadvantage is that this can result in partitions between the various staff sections and encourage a stovepipe approach.

Successful joint operations need close coordination, synchronisation and information exchange horizontally across all the staff sections. The most common way to encourage this cross-functional collaboration is to create permanent and temporary team structures which are organised around specific elements or tasks in the staff process, whereby the main processes are key. In large staffs, these teams are known as cells, centres, offices, elements and planning teams. Although they contain representatives from the various functional staff sections ('pillars'), the teams are almost always led by one of the primary staff sections. Thus a planning team for future operations will fall under J5 and JOC referred to above under the J3.



During the execution of a prolonged operation, staffs at the higher tactical and operational level in the decision-making process often use meetings to prepare and form decisions; these meetings are referred to internationally as working groups and boards. These meetings are held according to a fixed timetable, referred to internationally as the battle rhythm<sup>35</sup>. At these meetings, the input of all staff sections considered relevant is processed into an integral plan.

In some cases, the commander may decide to design a special staff organisation for a specific military action or operation. A temporary staff organisation will then be formed by grouping a number of general and specialist staff officers selected from the existing generic staff with the usual staff sections. Temporary task-oriented or project-based organisations could also be formed from the existing functional J-structure.

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<sup>35</sup> Battle rhythm is discussed further in Chapter 4.

## 3.6 Staffing

### 3.6.1 Liaison personnel

A liaison officer will represent his commander in the staff of another unit or in a non-military organisation<sup>36</sup>. By deploying liaison officers, the commander is able to exchange important information with commanders and staffs of other organisations in order to facilitate the desired harmonisation and coordination. A liaison officer must have a broad knowledge and extensive experience and must in any event be familiar with the organisation and work methods of the unit he represents. In a multinational context, the correct ranking is also important. The liaison officer has to be able to represent his commander in all functional areas and must, therefore, have the commander's trust<sup>37</sup>. In addition, or perhaps above all, he must know and understand the commander's intent. Lastly, he must have the necessary diplomatic skills. As well as individual liaisons, there is also the option of deploying liaison teams consisting of several specialists. Liaison officers should normally have direct access to the commander of the receiving unit and must be involved in the planning process from the outset.

### 3.6.2 Augmentees

In the active deployment of a headquarters, a core of an existing headquarters will often (have to) be augmented with personnel from other organisations. Staffs are generically structured and the nature of the operation and the mission area requires often scarce specialist capacity or extra general capacity to increase the staff's sustainability. Personnel augmentation could be done either by adding complete elements or even units from other organisations and countries (national intel support team, movement coordination cell, CIMIC staff element) to the existing staff structure, or on the basis of individual augmentees. Because the process sometimes involves large numbers, a headquarters must prepare in advance for the arrival of reinforcements and supplementary personnel. both in a physical sense (infrastructure, ICT, transport) and in a procedural sense (SOP, education and training).

<sup>36</sup> The liaison officer is not under the command of the commander of the receiving unit or organisation.

<sup>37</sup> The Operational Staff Handbook, NATO JWC (2007), describes the quality of liaison officers as follows: "LNOs should be one of the command's best. They represent the Commander, so if it doesn't hurt losing them they are the wrong person."

## 3.7 The headquarters

### 3.7.1 General aspects

The headquarters is a structure in which a commander and his staff are incorporated and from which he exercises his command. The location, size, structure, composition and design depend on the size of the unit and the characteristics of the operation and the mission area. In the case of larger units and formations, one usually refers to a (deployable) HQ rather than a command post.

An operation with a high dynamic and frequent movements over greater distances will impose demands on the HQ's deployability, mobility and setup; poorly accessible areas and a high threat of force will influence the choice of location or the level of protection.

### 3.7.2 Site requirements

Despite the existence of IT capabilities, it is still important for people to meet in person and exchange ideas and opinions. A commander will, therefore, wish to speak to his staff on a regular basis. Personal contact is a major contributory factor in maintaining situational awareness, so the availability of sufficient conference and meeting rooms is one of the main site requirements for a command post or HQ. That requires a sufficient level of usable infrastructure. The need for command posts to be deployable at all times has also led to mirroring (redundancy backup) and thus expansion. These developments have an adverse effect on the required mobility and deployability.

If, during deployment, there is little or no threat, there is sufficient infrastructure of the required quality and work can be done in one place over a prolonged period, there will be virtually no restrictions on the size of a command post. The HQ must be readily accessible to all actors in the mission area. This accessibility and the visible presence of a commander and his staff are sometimes at odds with the security requirements and place specific demands on protection arrangements. Risk management is, therefore, an important aspect in the choice of site. Prior to the deployment of a headquarters, a reconnaissance team may be sent to the mission area for the purpose of identifying the possibilities and restrictions.

A headquarters can be set up either on land or at sea and the characteristics of each provide different, sometimes complementary capacities. The choice depends on the situation and it may be the case that an HQ that is initially sea-based is transferred onto land or hands over the tasks to a land-based HQ that has been set up in the meantime.

A sea-based HQ is often ready-made and rapidly deployable. Sailing takes time, naturally, but the transit time to the mission area can be put to good use. The reinforcement and work-up of the staff can be done during the voyage and C2 can be started. The freedom of navigation in open water makes it possible to reach and be visibly present in the vicinity of the mission area unhindered and without the need for transit permission over and through other countries. Organic maritime logistic assets ensure logistic support with a minimal requirement for host nation support (HNS). Although other ships can be used to provide extra space, the space available on the command ship is limited and will determine the number of officials on board; a specially equipped floating command platform is required to be able to carry a larger joint headquarters. The communication devices and the necessary bandwidth for communications are in principle more limited than those of a land-based HQ.





A large land-based HQ is normally less rapidly deployable than its sea-based counterpart, although smaller elements of a land-based HQ can be deployed rapidly and, because of their relatively limited size, can be air-transported quickly to the mission area. Land-based HQs require a major logistic effort for deployment and support. On the other hand, this type of HQ can provide the most extensive command support and can thus meet the C2 requirements of operations at every level. Land-based HQs are usually the best solution in the long term.

### 3.7.3 Types of headquarters

The different types of headquarters (or joint command posts) are as follows: the main CP/main HQ, the forward CP or forward element/HQ and the alternate CP. In effect, the different concepts are based on one CP/HQ which can be physically and/or functionally divided over different locations. IT support makes it possible to provide integral leadership and support from different locations for one or more operations.

#### 3.7.3.1 *Main command post*

This is the central staff body from which an operation or action is prepared and the execution monitored, all staff functions are coordinated and all attached units are directed. Almost without exception, this CP will be led by the chief of staff. He will make decisions in respect of composition, organisation, location, deployment and setup of the HQ. Even though this CP is in principle the commander's main location, it does not mean that he will always be there in person.

#### 3.7.3.2 *Forward command post*

This is an offshoot element of the main CP from which the commander and some of his staff can lead the operation or action temporarily, sometimes in advance of deployment of the main CP. This CP has enough facilities to create and maintain the necessary situational awareness in the short term. Mobility and a minimum security capacity are other important requirements. By using reachback<sup>38</sup>, the capacity of the forward element can be increased. The forward element is not an extra level of command; the main HQ and the forward element together form one headquarters.

#### 3.7.3.3 *Alternate command post*

It is inefficient to duplicate a main CP in its entirety, but for continuity in command it is necessary to back up essential elements of a command post (redundancy). If the main CP has to be moved to a new location or is disabled, these backup capacities will be used to set up a temporary CP. Alternate CPs are particularly important at tactical level.

### 3.7.4 **Structure**

To enable the exchange of personnel between units and collaboration with others, a standardisation of structure and work method is required. All commanders and staffs, however, have their own procedures and extra requirements in respect of how the HQ is set up. These are set out in SOPs and SOIs. A number of basic requirements are generic:

- sufficient working space for the various staff sections;
- conference and presentation rooms;
- enough space for transport assets (helicopters, vehicles and floating assets if applicable);

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<sup>38</sup> Reachback is explained in Section 3.7.5.

- reliable energy supply;
- room for logistic and personnel support;
- sufficient room for the expansion of infrastructure as a result of temporary and permanent augmentation of personnel and equipment.
- the possibility of providing adequate protection for the HQ against the prevailing threat.

The headquarters is the force's calling card, and the impression it gives is extremely important in shaping the public image in respect of the level of professionalism. Opponents are also aware that the HQ is one of the main elements of the C2 capability and will attempt to degrade or even destroy it. Communication and information infrastructures are of particular interest in this respect. Discrediting the HQ and the conduct of staff officials could be part of their strategy and all officials working in a CP must be aware of these risks.

### 3.7.5 Reachback capacity

The use of reachback involves falling back on the full support in the stay-behind HQ through over-the-horizon C2 and CIS.<sup>39</sup> This enables the forward deployment of only some HQ elements, keeping any loss of quality in the C2 to a minimum. Using reachback means a reduction of the HQ footprint in the mission area, a decrease in the required (strategic) transport capacity and a reduced need for maintenance capacity in the mission area and the associated capacity for force protection. The ability to tap into extra capacity for planning and (expertise) support at a distance serves to expand the organic capacity of a headquarters. Although the advantages are considerable, however, the disadvantages of reachback should not be underestimated. Reachback is entirely dependent on robust CIS, including bandwidth. The dynamics of the operation are much less evident outside the area of operations, which may give rise to a discrepancy between involvement and the sense of urgency. The forwardmost element must have round-the-clock access to functional and specialist expertise in the HQ. It is vital that reachback does not have an adverse effect on the unity of command; the dispersed HQ elements must form a single whole.

<sup>39</sup> "Reachback, at the operational level, is the process of obtaining command and control products, services and applications in a timely manner, from deployed and static elements forming a single operational level HQ, in order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness while minimizing the operational level HQ footprint in theatre", MCM-0019-2008, 27 March 2008. In NATO, reachback is inextricably linked to what are known as deployable joint staff elements (DJSE), which form the forwardmost element of a joint force HQ.

The commander will decide what degree of reachback is to be used. Considerations in determining the degree of dependence on reachback include accessibility of the mission area and the level of threat, whereby the size of the required HQ can be reduced. The duration of the operation and the requirements for support are also factors which determine the choice of reachback. Some – usually non-time-critical – functionalities lend themselves to reachback support:

- long-term planning;
- specific intelligence support;
- build-up of non-military expertise (including academic support);
- strategic transport, long-term sustainment;
- operational analysis;
- supplementary political and legal guidance.

## 4. Decision making and control

### 4.1 Introduction and definition

#### 4.1.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the second and third components of C2 - decision making and control – and is divided into six sections. The first section defines both concepts and introduces them, after which the following sections will discuss the specifically military decision making and the decision-making process. The last three sections look at the various aspects of decision making in the analysis and planning, in the execution and finally in the assessment.

#### 4.1.2 Introduction to decision making

Along with leadership, decision making is the commander's main activity. The military definition of decision making is the ability to take a decision about a course of action to achieve an imposed or self-chosen objective in support of the higher commander's intent. The starting points here are this intent and the specific orders to the subordinate commander (see Section 2 for more details).



Commanders must establish at all levels what the desired end state is, what the main targets are to achieve it, which actors can play a role and what information must be available. They do not, therefore, simply decide on the deployment of their own (sometimes specifically assigned) assets. A well functioning intelligence process<sup>40</sup> is, therefore, essential for effective decision making.

The ultimate aim of any decision-making process is to arrive at a plan which has a good chance of succeeding. This plan will then be translated into workable tasks and announced in good time, so that those implementing it will have sufficient preparation time.<sup>41</sup> The decisions that are expressed in the orders must be in line with the intent of the authorising commander. They are thus flexible, and allow freedom for those carrying them out to make any necessary adjustments, for instance as a result of changing circumstances.

Because of the time that is normally available, the planning phase of an operation or action is ideal for the meticulous execution of the decision-making process, whereby a great deal of time will be available for the necessary coordination with other staffs involved in the operation. But it is while the plan is being implemented, when there is often less time available, that quick decisions have to be made. It is only then that unforeseen opportunities or threats might arise and that the effects of action taken in response to them will be visible and possibly measurable.

#### 4.1.3 Introduction to control

Control is *the continuous process used by a commander to organise, direct and coordinate the activities of the units assigned to him as well as any support units*. He does so by setting out decisions in orders, monitoring the execution of the orders and checking and evaluating the achieved result in accordance with the principles of cyclic decision making (see Section 4.3 for more detail). During the decision making, the various activities planned for the units will be synchronised and integrated as much as possible in order to achieve the desired effects. The commander will make any necessary adjustments to the actual execution by means of a fragmentary order. He will be assisted in this by his staff. Only the commander himself has the authority to direct troops, even though in practice he will often delegate that authority to his staff for routine matters. That does not alter the fact that consultation is possible at all times between staffs and sub units about all kinds of functional matters. Control is a continuous process.

<sup>40</sup> The Joint Doctrine Publication 2: Intelligence (expected to be issued in 2010) will look at this in detail.

<sup>41</sup> In practice, the 1/3 - 2/3 rule is used, whereby one-third of the available time will be reserved for the decision making and two-thirds will be allocated to the executive level.



The point at which the commander issues his orders to his subordinate commanders is the ideal moment to convey his intent and explain his decision.

Whereas decision making focuses on the *analysis* and *definition* of the problem and the *design* of possible solutions, and is intellectual in nature, control concentrates more on the *implementation* of the decisions and the *exploitation* of time and space. It is more instrumental in nature and thus lends itself more to standardisation and computer support. In effect, a commander is providing his subordinate commanders with a set of instructions, even though they should be treated with caution in a complex environment in which actors and factors can change rapidly. A commander will show restraint in delegating control authority if he wants to be able to intervene quickly to ensure that his intent is realised. Control is 'information-heavy' and is characterised by processes and procedures.

A knowledge and command of actual doctrine and a practice-based set of standard operating procedures (SOP) for attached units and standard operating instructions (SOI) for the staff are essential to be able to coordinate the activities of attached troops. The use of these during the education and training period, particularly during the mission-oriented training prior to a deployment, is thus vital for the successful execution of a mission.

It is crucial that any decisions taken are made known. As an exception, in the case of relatively straightforward tasks of short duration, this can be done orally. Normally, though, in the case of more complex actions and operations involving specifically trained forces, this will be done by means of written plans and orders, a list of which is included in Annex 4-1. These plans and orders can be provided rapidly in digital form, although for a successful execution, personal contact between the commander and his subordinate commanders and troops is essential, even in the case of larger structures. That is the only way to guarantee unity of opinion about the course of action and the intent. Personal contact has always been and will continue to be the crucial factor for control.

## 4.2 Military decision making

The (politico-) military decision making has various levels, each with its own specific characteristics which obviously affect the decision making. That is why specific decision-making models have been developed over the years for and at these levels.

### 4.2.1 Military-strategic level

This level involves the decision making prior to any actual deployment. Because the Dutch armed forces conduct complex combined and joint operations in association with other instruments of power of the Dutch state, often in an international context, the focus in both the preparation and execution of operations is on achieving mission results. This requires fully integrated and cohesive preparations between unit training, mission-oriented planning and political decision making, all of which needs joint planning by the various actors, based on a common focus in the operation. Control of the planning, preparation and execution of the military contribution to operations, including the required decision making, is set out in the CHOD (Chief of Defence) Field Manual 2: Operational Planning Process (OPP). This is based on set tasks, powers and responsibilities and is designed to achieve optimum harmonisation of national and international political and military decision making. This harmonisation is simplified by the fact that the Netherlands itself also plays a role in international decision making, for example in NATO as a member of the North Atlantic Council / NATO Military Committee and of the Permanent Security Committee / EU Military Committee. It is a dynamic, generic planning process, which must be applied with flexibility in each operation.




CHOD Field Manual 2 contains a flowchart based on the main national products (such as the Article 100 Letter to Parliament and the OPLAN). Specific national organs are also mentioned, such as the Military Operations Steering Group (SMO). CHOD Field Manual 2 therefore provides information 'upstream and downstream'. It also includes formats of important documents that result from the process and gives ideas (interim briefings, for example) for aspects which could have an impact in the course of the OPP. The relation to unit training is also shown. This is designed to clarify what those taking part in the CHOD OPP can expect from each other in the different phases of the process.

#### 4.2.2 Operational and higher tactical level

It is true that decision making at operational and higher tactical level is based on a generic decision-making model, but it is characterised by a high degree of complexity. This is brought about partly by the many civil and military actors, each with their own interests, the time factor (short term versus long term), desired and undesired effects, existing relations and the role of the media.

At operational level, the decision making normally focuses on operations over a prolonged period. On the basis of the stated end, the ways determined at strategic level and the required means, the operational level will seek ways to achieve this objective. After careful consideration, a decision will then be taken. The reality of operating in a joint and multi-agency environment will play a major role in this respect.



NATO's OPP (see Annex 4-2 for a brief overview) serves as the basis for the decision-making process at operational and higher tactical level and is described in detail in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5 for operational planning. The Allied Command Operations (ACO) Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP) serve as the primary planning instrument. These describe all relevant aspects of operational planning; they provide guidelines concerning the planning factors to be taken into account when formulating an operation plan and include the standard structure and content of this plan.

#### 4.2.3 Tactical level

At tactical level, decisions are taken about the execution of actual activities which contribute to the objectives formulated at operational level. The availability of a staff will often determine the way in which a commander conducts the decision-making process. Although the NATO OPP can also be useful in the decision-making process at tactical level, there are at that level other, more fitting process models that can be used. Examples of domain-specific models at tactical level are the tactical decision-making model or tactical estimate, the maritime OPP, the seven-questions model (designed by the British armed forces and also called the combat estimate) and what the Netherlands calls the OATDOEM model (Dutch acronym for orientation, analysis, terrain, threat, other factors, own assets and capabilities)<sup>42</sup>.

Certain aspects of the various models can be combined. Decision-making models must, therefore, be used with flexibility and never as a rigid set of rules. The commander will decide on the basis of his own knowledge, experience and style, as well as the capabilities of his staff, what method he will use for his decision making. Experience of working at higher tactical levels and proficiency in carrying out the OPP are required for a successful application.

#### 4.2.4 Different decision-making methods

These military decision-making models are based on the rational synoptic model, where the aim is to make as rational and substantiated a decision as possible on the basis of the information available. This decision-making model has a set of norms, values and predictions: the emphasis is on professional knowledge, reasoning, processes and procedures. Military commanders must, however, be aware that there are also other ways to reach a decision, with more emphasis on perceptions, views, interests and power. Many actors, both in and outside a coalition, are used to acting in this way.

<sup>42</sup> These decision-making models are elaborated upon further in the Field Manual on Command and Control and the Maritime Doctrine and Tactics Centre's publication 'The Maritime Operational Planning Process – methods and techniques'.



Military decisions are thus seen in a wider context, where they are merely a factor, sometimes even a secondary one, in the overall situation. To understand what happens in a complex environment and to be able to continue to operate effectively, therefore, other factors must be taken into account in the decision making. When evaluating the decision making, approaches other than the strictly rational approach might offer better solutions. Flexibility and creativity in spirit on the part of commanders and their staffs are, therefore, essential.

### 4.3 The decision-making process

This section describes the decision-making process. Because military decision making takes place within the broader context of operational art, this will be discussed briefly to start with. The elements of operational design and operational management will then be examined, after which the cyclic decision-making model will be explained.

#### 4.3.1 Operational art

Operational art is the creative and analytical process relating to the preparation and execution of an operation, coordinated with other actors, whereby strategic objectives are translated into tactical activities designed to achieve the desired effects.

The concept dates back to the Cold War era, but is equally relevant to operations in which crisis resolution is not exclusively determined by military successes. It comprises the use of the creative skills of a commander and his staff to formulate complex, unstructured problems clearly and logically in order to facilitate detailed planning, resulting in clear orders. Operational art is the result of a combination of a commander's capabilities and the staff-supported processes of operational design and operational management.

#### **4.3.2 Operational design**

Operational design formulates the problem and then develops and refines the commander's operational ideas – his vision on how the operation should unfold – in order to create a basis for detailed and workable plans. Operational design takes place throughout the entire operation, adjusted where necessary by changes in the strategic directives. It should never be seen as a completed phase, as the situation can change at any time. That is why regular reconsideration and refinement are permanent elements of a continuous operational redesign if the situation actually changes. A commander must, therefore, be able to deal with uncertainty and be able to use chaos to his advantage. Partly because of that, a continuous evaluation must form part of his design process.

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#### **4.3.3 Operational management**

Operational management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises in the execution of an operation, as well as constantly evaluating its progress. The responses of the opponent will inevitably impact on our own actions. Evaluating the progress of the operation and then reacting swiftly (in order to change the plan in such a way as to ensure that the desired effect can still be achieved in the new situation) are thus important methods for the commander in his leadership of a joint unit.

#### **4.3.4 Cyclic nature of decision making**

Decision making is a continuous process. Military organisations recognise the cycle: analysis, planning, execution and assessment. Analysis in this case consists of selecting the aim and forming a picture, while forming a judgement is done during the planning phase. This cycle is shown below in the form of a diagram, placed in the wider context of the operational art described earlier, and will be explored further in the following sections.




Figure 4-1: 'Cyclic decision making'<sup>43</sup>

### 4.3.5 Analysis

#### 4.3.5.1 Selecting the aim

Selecting the aim means deciding on the aim to be achieved. It is important for those involved to have the same clear picture of the desired end in order to provide direction for the required effort. The reason for achieving the specific end (purpose) must, therefore, be clear. Only then can a successful method be developed. If there is a long-term vision, in other words a desired end state, it will be easier to formulate secondary objectives. First of all, the question of whether, and on what conditions, the end can be realised must be established, with an indication of the timescale and the cost (the available assets). To ensure that objectives are realistic, the assets to be deployed must be weighed up against the aim. Objectives must also comply with the SMART criteria: specific, measurable, acceptable, realistic and timed.

<sup>43</sup> Source: NATO Allied Joint Publication 01 (D)

Ideally, the selection of the aim will be carried out by a small group of officials, so the top of the organisation, possibly assisted by representatives of the lower management level or external experts, will normally conduct this step in the decision-making process.

#### 4.3.5.2 *Forming a picture*

This process involves the creation of a picture of relevant aspects of the situation in which the goal has to be achieved. An organisation has to focus constant attention on the environment in which it is conducting its activities; in doing so, each organisation will concentrate on the aspects relevant to its functionality and will constantly update its picture in terms of its own strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT). The execution of a SWOT analysis is, therefore, a frequently recurring activity in organisations.



The Defence organisation focuses on those actors and factors that are important to it. Examples of these could be the local population, the opponent, potential coalition partners, IOs, GOs and NGOs, climate, terrain and political, historical, social and cultural developments in the mission area. Creating a picture in this context is a continuous activity within an organisation. Alongside the continuous process of creating and maintaining this general picture, a more detailed picture will be created for decisions on a formulated objective or task.

#### **4.3.6 Planning**

##### *4.3.6.1 Forming a judgement*

The process of *forming a judgement* consists of developing and assessing the possibilities that will lead to the accomplishment of the goal. This phase will focus on exploring which methods, bearing in mind the available assets, could lead to the accomplishment of the formulated objective within the set timeframe. Experienced officials often tend to offer the same or similar solutions in this phase, and because of tunnel vision other possible solutions are rarely, if ever, given a chance. As well as professional skill, therefore, a realistic creative ability is indispensable in the process of forming a judgement.

First of all, a judgement will be made as to which effects could help towards the realisation of the objective. The actions necessary to achieve those effects will then be examined, and only then will the required assets be identified. For each option, a possible prediction will be made as to the response to each individual action as well as to all the actions as a whole. The advantages, disadvantages and risks of each option will then be identified, together with the claim that will be made on the available assets. The expected level of acceptance is also often an important criterion in forming a judgement as to the most appropriate option.

##### *4.3.6.2 Decision making*

In this phase, a decision will be made on the basis of the analysis conducted in the earlier stages as to the option that seems most appropriate to solve the problem. This will be done by the individual or agency in charge and with decision-making authority within the organisation.

#### **4.3.7 Execution**

This is the phase in which the plans are executed. It is also in this phase that additional analysis and planning takes place at various aggregation levels, fed by the progression of the operation and the evaluation of the situation.

#### 4.3.8 Assessment

While activities are being performed and after they have been completed, the organisation will examine whether the aim can be or has been achieved, and whether this is being or has been done in the most efficient way. There are two forms of assessment: product assessment and process assessment. First of all, it is important to investigate whether the set objective has been achieved (product assessment) within the set time and with the assets provided. This assessment is not only carried out on completion of the task; on the contrary, regular checks are made during the execution, in particular at important benchmark points, to see whether the operation is on the right track and whether completion is feasible within the envisaged time frame and with the available assets. It may sometimes be necessary to make adjustments on the basis of supplementary decision making during the execution.

Checks will also be made both during the activities and on completion to find out whether the selected method is indeed proceeding in the best possible manner or that it has been properly executed (process assessment). A process assessment might indicate an alternative deployment of assets and/or the deployment of other assets.

### 4.4 Decision making during analysis and planning

#### 4.4.1 Complex operational problems

The complex operational environment requires an alternative to the usual military approach to solving problems. The military traditionally tend to adopt a direct and rationally analytical approach to a problem and to come up with a workable solution as quickly as possible. Military personnel are still somewhat solution-oriented, whereby there is a tendency to forget about any analysis of underlying causes or reasons. In this complex operational environment, however, it is precisely the task of gaining an understanding of the situation that demands a great deal of attention. It is pointless to go through detailed planning without having first investigated thoroughly the underlying cause of the problem.

##### 4.4.1.1 Characteristics

The main characteristics of complex operational or ill-structured problems are as follows.

- **No definitive or clear-cut solution.** A well-structured problem can be clearly defined; it is easy to indicate what information is needed to resolve it. In the case of ill-structured problems, this is not necessarily possible. The required information depends on the definition of the problem, and the solution depends on the assumed cause of the problem. Ill-structured problems rarely have just one single cause. On top of that, the various interested parties interpret and assess the causes, implications and importance of the problem differently.

Understanding and formulating a complex situation thus depends partly on the chosen perspective, although this does not mean that no objective causes exist. Defining a complex operational problem is about seeking an interpretation that can be used by all parties.

- **The problem definition indicates the way to the solution.** In practice, problem definition and the development of a route to a solution are simultaneous cognitive processes. If, for example, a conflict is deemed to be the result of a failed economy, the way to a solution will differ from that in a case where failed government is regarded as the cause of the conflict.
- **Each situation is essentially new and unique.** Historical examples can be useful, but the differences between comparable situations are often significant. Political objectives, interests of the actors involved, cultural and social conditions, etc, differ from case to case.
- **No standard solutions.** Tactical doctrine often provides standard formats for actions, procedures or drills which can be used with only minor adjustments. For complex problems at strategic and operational level, however, there are no ready-made solutions. For this type of problem, doctrine can only offer instruments and handholds which help in the deliberations about the problem and in seeking the way to a solution, but cannot provide the solution itself.
- **Solutions are 'better or worse', not 'right or wrong'.** There is no objective yardstick for success, so the opinions of different parties may differ with regard to the quality of a solution. The suitability of the solution thus depends on the one hand on the problem definition by the various parties and, on the other, on what success means to them.
- **Interactive complexity.** Operational problems are complex because of the extensive freedom of action of the various actors. The same action conducted at different times can have different results, so cause and effect are difficult to explain and predict.
- **Watertight solutions do not exist.** The quality of a solution can vary according to the timing. A solution that was initially regarded as good could ultimately have disastrous consequences if unintended secondary effects gradually become apparent. A situation assessment is also difficult because the results of actions taken often cannot be measured directly.

- **There is no definitive solution.** It is usually impossible to conclude at any given moment that an operational problem has been definitively resolved. Work on the solution will be continued until the situation is deemed 'satisfactory' or until national interests have changed or sources have been exhausted.
- **A complex operational problem might be a symptom of another problem.** The definition of a problem largely determines the way to a possible solution. However, when solving one problem, a problem of a higher order may come to light, indicating that the first problem was a symptom of the second. One must not then merely attempt to deal with the symptoms, but indeed strive for a solution to the higher problem. Here too, however, there is a pitfall: if the problem of a higher order is too abstract in its definition, it is less likely that the various aspects of the specific problem will be solved.
- **The problem solver must not fail.** Assisted by his staff, the operational commander must accomplish his objectives and he remains responsible at all times for the consequences of his decisions.

To recap: because there is no single way of resolving complex operational problems (each problem is new and different), an operational commander must design the solution himself. There is no checklist, although there are aids in the form of planning processes. But the rule that always applies is that the definition of the problem will always result in a particular route to a solution.

#### 4.4.1.2 *Defining and solving the problem*

The analysis focuses primarily on defining the problem and on an initial conceptual approach; the commander plays a crucial role in this. A good analysis and description of the problem will usually indicate a possible way to tackle it, the design of an operation. The assessment of the problem and objectives formulated on that basis then become the ingredients of a structured planning process, in which the staff develop workable and feasible plans and orders in accordance with the commander's directives. The first part of the decision making is creative and iterative in nature and mainly involves operational art and operational design. In ideal conditions, the second part, the planning, is a practical, logical and linear activity, but can by necessity also be an iterative process in practice.

#### 4.4.2 Effects-based thinking

Despite the fact that each action produces intended and often also unintended effects, these have often not been central in the decision-making process in the past, although they have played a role of some sort. In recent years, however, the effects-based approach has been moving steadily to the forefront, even more so because the effects of military operations have a huge impact on the end result. The effects-based approach will, therefore, be discussed below.

##### 4.4.2.1 Effects-based approach

The effects-based approach assumes a causal link between actions and effects. In practical terms, there is a need at all levels for a broad analysis of the complex environment. Each of these levels has a specific analysis requirement, in which the assessment of the international and national situation plays a role. It is important to try to achieve a seamless connection between the different levels, but this is not always easy because of the difference in approach.

An effects-based approach used at politico-strategic level focuses primarily on interdepartmental integration and on coordination with international agencies. An analysis of the progress of the entire campaign should also be monitored at this level. For an effects-based approach, there is a clear need at the politico-strategic level for early harmonisation of the areas of interest, the desired effects and thus the strategy. Adequate integration at the politico-strategic level is, therefore, essential.

The application of an effects-based approach at military-strategic level focuses mainly on a clear agreement as to how the effects to be achieved with military assets can be accomplished and to what extent they can contribute to the overall effect. That is why harmonisation of the intended effects with other instruments of power is highly important. At this level, this will result in a requirement for an integrated situational analysis of all relevant factors (see Section 4.4.2.2 and onwards).

The application of an effects-based approach at military-operational level is more complicated than that at military-strategic level, as actions here have to be linked to the intended effects. At the executive level, therefore, there is a substantial requirement for specialist expertise. At the operational level, an effects-based approach is facilitated by a continuous political, military, economic, social, infrastructural and information (PMESII) analysis of actors, factors and processes which provide a founded insight into the complex environment. This level also measures the effectiveness of the campaign for the purposes of evaluation.

The military task must be seen in relation to the deployment of all means and must be synchronised with the actions of other actors. It must also be clear which actions have to be performed by the military domain and which have to be conducted by others. There must also be a synchronisation of actions which could have an effect in another domain. The intended long-term effects are the central consideration.

The actual linking of actions to the desired effects at military-operational level is not straightforward, as the causality between the proposed actions and the effects they are to achieve is not always easy to establish. It is, however, clear that the accomplishment of effects in a complex environment depends on a great many factors. Neither the military domain nor national organisations have control of many of these factors, something which makes it tricky to determine the actions needed for the desired effects. It is also the case that the intended effects sometimes become apparent only in the long term, while the military apparatus strives to maintain a high operational tempo in order to retain the initiative.

Planning and execution in accordance with an effects-based approach have no specific consequences for equipment as far as the staff structure is concerned. There is a need at military-operational level, however, for sufficient capacity from other departments to allow diplomatic, economic and information activities to be conducted.

The effects-based approach has no direct implications for the chain of command, but it does affect the way it is implemented because of the increased requirement for insight into matters unrelated to the military apparatus itself. The necessary expertise will be established mainly through education and training.

Opinion is divided in respect of the most suitable staff organisation for an effects-based approach. Some feel that no adjustment of the J-structure is necessary, while others believe that the establishment of an effects-based planning cell, execution cell and analysis cell is required. Experiments with this construction have now been conducted in NATO. But as well as this rigid implementation of an effects-based staff construction, there are also hybrid forms. For the implementation of an effects-based approach there is also, for example, the effects-based synchronisation cell (a form of effects-based planning cell) as an addition to the traditional J-structure.

Multinational operations have provided experience of the effects cell, consisting of planners and evaluators (operational analysts). They indicate the desired effects and suggest concrete actions to achieve them. A long-term planning cell (J5) then plans the concrete actions, after which an operations section will perform them. For this, the section has a

small planning capacity (J35) to steer the ongoing action, an element (J33) which coordinates the actual execution and a targeting cell which conducts the target analysis. The viewpoints of the various civil disciplines will be incorporated into the planning as much as possible. Key personnel will be anthropologists, CIMIC advisers, the political adviser, the development adviser, the cultural adviser and also a geospatial analyst. The latter is able to present historical information from a database in a geographical dimension, making it quicker to see how incidents are linked. A 'red team' is useful for conducting 'perception checks'. This analyses the way in which the intended action is expected to be perceived by other parties involved.

The traditional J-structure can be seen in most effects-based cells; in particular Intelligence (J2), Operations (J3), Plans (J5) and CIMIC (J9) are represented in all effects-based cells. This would argue for maintaining the existing structure, supplemented by an umbrella staff function (operational analyst) alongside the chief of staff who does the effects-based coordination of the J-staff and ensures that the required processes of an effects-based approach are adhered to. This is what it looks like with the current J-structure.




Figure 4-2: 'Effects based cells'

It is vital that a knowledge base be set up before planning can be started. This knowledge base must generate continuous situational awareness of all factors in the environment, whereby a broader and deeper intelligence requirement may arise. Furthermore, the planning process must first result in a clear indication of the actions geared towards achieving the desired effects and, secondly, to a clearer link between strategic direction and tactical activities. The implementation must focus not only on the execution of the tasks themselves, but at the same time on the collection of information for the long term.

Progress of the campaign has to be measured on the basis of the results achieved in terms of set sub-objectives. Initially, therefore, after the measurement of performance (MoP), a measurement of effect (MoE) will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the campaign. Measurements of activities are then needed to be able to interpret the effects and possibly to relate them to our own operations. This requires a continuous flow of information between the various actors and staff elements. The harmonisation of the actions between the various domains in the execution phase is, however, not always as good as it could be. Another problem with the effects-based approach in the operational planning process is the causality between actions and the effects to be achieved. The planning process is particularly tricky, as operations take place in a complex environment in which effects often occur as a result of a cumulation of actions. The specific problems of causality and long-term effects versus operational tempo present a challenge and are thus one of the weaknesses of the effects-based approach.

With an effects-based approach, both desired and undesired effects direct the mission analysis and the decision on the course of action (COA). If the operational planning process is conducted from that perspective, there is a greater chance that objectives can be translated into actions. Having a common understanding of the effects for the entire campaign before the tasks are formulated and assigned is the key to an effects-based approach in the COA development, analysis, comparison and selection. The better the collaboration, the greater the chance of integrating the different capacities. In short, in spite of a few challenges, the effects-based approach offers more precision and substance in the formulation and coordination of joint actions before, during and after an operation.

#### 4.4.2.2 PMESII domains

Analyses such as that of the political, military, economic, social, infrastructural and information (PMESII) systems in the operational environment generate situational awareness (SA) and provide an insight into the opportunities and threats in the operation. They can then be approached kinetically or non-kinetically to achieve the desired result. If the adversary is a state, all systems will normally be present. In the case of non-state actors (NSA), the PMESII systems are lacking; in that case, a different set of information requirements is used for funding, recruitment, information and support (FRIS). The threat does not, however, necessarily have to be of a physical nature, but can also be non-physical, such as famine or poverty; in general terms, the threat is the undesirable situation against which the joint actions are directed. PMESII is often used in defence circles, but it must not become dogma; other methods aimed at other dimensions can often serve just as well, if not better. Attention must not be diverted by semantics, but must be focused on the intended result.

##### 4.4.2.2.1 Use of knowledge development (KD)

Knowledge development is the process that collects and analyses information, integrates isolated data into a useable body of information and makes it available so it can be shared in order to support understanding of the environment. Knowledge development is conducted by personnel trained and experienced in the field of data and knowledge acquisition and processing. In terms of the data and knowledge used in a model, a situational analysis will result in a perception of reality. This means that the situational analysis will provide a picture of the actual situation and a picture of how to influence it with considered actions ('scenario building'). The situational analysis involves, therefore, more than merely listing facts and factors of influence and must focus explicitly on how these factors can be influenced.

In an integrated PMESII analysis, data and knowledge can be obtained not only by military actors, but by a contribution on the part of all actors involved. In order to achieve integrated KD, there is a need for processes which facilitate that integration and for a clear definition of the tasks and responsibilities necessary for managing the collection and use of data and knowledge. These processes are known as knowledge management (KM).

##### 4.4.2.2.2 Use of knowledge management (KM)

Data from governmental and non-governmental organisations must be gathered and 'managed'. Knowledge management (KM) is the organisational process which enables the collection, fusion, organisation and communication of data and knowledge, thus allowing the timely use of the information. This has to be a centralised process in which all actors

involved collect and analyse their own data. In the management of data and knowledge, account must be taken of security classifications.

KD and KM will start during the initial phase of an operation, but will carry on as a continuous process in the event of a threat that is not time- or place-critical, such as terrorism or the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In an operation, KD will continue until the end and is an iterative process; in time-unlimited cases, KD and KM are continuous processes.

#### 4.4.3 Dangers of groupthink

A commander and his staff must beware of the dangers of groupthink in their decision making. Groupthink is a psychosocial phenomenon in which a group of actually highly competent people are influenced by group processes to such an extent that the quality of group decisions is diminished. It occurs when group members focus primarily on preserving agreement and unanimity in a decision-making process rather than on a critical evaluation of the facts.

There are various characteristics which can be identified before groupthink occurs and which can easily apply to a military staff. The more pronounced these characteristics in the staff, the more likely the staff will be to fall victim to groupthink. Examples of these are:

- the existence of a close-knit group;
- leadership by means of authoritative directives or charismatic leadership;
- homogeneous qualities of the members in terms of social background and ideology;
- high levels of stress caused by external threats.

Symptoms of groupthink are a tendency for the group to overestimate itself, short-sightedness and pressure for conformity. These symptoms may result in a flawed decision-making process. Groupthink is not, however, inevitable; a staff can take the necessary precautions to avoid or at least reduce it. Possible measures that could reduce the risk of groupthink are:

- appointing a 'devil's advocate';
- encouraging the group members to adopt a critical stance and stress that they will not be held to account for this; critical remarks will be used as constructive input;

- impartiality on the part of the commander, who will not indicate any preference beforehand and will ideally use only objective information in the decision making;
- setting up independent subgroups (one to make the decision and another to evaluate it);
- splitting the staff into subgroups to discuss a topic;
- involving outsiders in the staff, for new ideas and to offer a critical approach to existing ideas.

#### **4.4.4 Restrictions in time, space and means**

The military decision-making process takes place under extreme pressure of time, something which is also apparent in the execution of the operation. On top of that, the commander often lacks the necessary leeway to implement his plans as he would wish because of the situational factors referred to previously; his freedom of movement will be limited by geographical factors. Furthermore, it is often impossible to have all the required personnel and equipment available at the right time. In short, a commander will be limited in his decision making and subsequent action in terms of time, space and means. Despite these restrictions, a commander must not normally delay his decisions. The great danger in this is that the opponent will gain sufficient time to bring up reinforcements and thus create a more favourable situation for himself.

There is no standard procedure for determining when a commander needs to make his decisions and take action. He will determine that moment himself, on the basis of advice from his staff and other actors, his knowledge, experience and professional expertise.

## 4.5 Decision making in the execution stage

### 4.5.1 Operational management

During an operation, armed forces conduct various activities simultaneously. Over time, however, the nature of an operation or the campaign theme will change and so too will the balance between these activities. This could happen, for example, as a response to the opponent's actions. It is difficult to say exactly when such a transition occurs. The commander's opinion is crucial in this respect, and may even result in a situation in which different approaches are applied in different sectors of the area of operations. Generally speaking, all activities can take place simultaneously, regardless of the campaign theme. It may be the case, for example, that a need arises for a small-scale attack during a peace support operation.

#### 4.5.1.1 Monitoring progress of the operation

Determining the level of success is a fundamental aspect of a military operation. For this, the commander must formulate SMART criteria in his concept of operations (CONOPS) and operations plan (OPLAN). He must establish whether the envisaged desired effects have been achieved, and that involves more than merely establishing whether an individual target has been eliminated. This is particularly relevant in actions where the emphasis is not so much on the physical destruction of targets, but more on changing the attitude of the opponent. Regardless of the nature of the operation, the commander must ensure that a careful monitoring and evaluation process is carried out, whereby events at tactical level must not cloud the view of the operational end state.

The monitoring and evaluation process is designed to assess the probability of achieving the various intended effects and thus provide the commander with the operational insight he needs to assign the various units to the different components (apportionment). The process must also enable the commander to establish whether an operation is proceeding according to plan. In this way, he can ascertain the need for any contingency plans. The process must also confirm that the right centre of gravity (CoG) and the associated weaknesses have been selected. The commander must be aware that new weaknesses may arise, or that it might not be possible to attack identified weaknesses. The analysis of the CoG is, therefore, an iterative process for the planning staff, in which the CoG has to be reviewed at regular intervals.

The commander has to develop an evaluation process that contributes to the decision-making process. The evaluation process occurs at different levels. At strategic level, it will answer the question of whether the coalition is achieving the strategic aims, while at operational level it will look at both the operational aims of the coalition and the assumed

operational objectives of the opponent in the light of the desired operational end state. Lastly, at tactical level, it will deal with the question of whether the various component commands are doing the right things to achieve the strategic aim.

The result of these evaluations will be used in the decision making. Ultimately, the JFC is responsible for the evaluation process. He will develop guidelines for the conduct of operational and tactical assessments for the joint operations area (JOA). These guidelines define the tactics, techniques and procedures for all assessments within the JOA. The operational assessments will eventually serve as building blocks for the decision-making process at strategic level.

#### 4.5.1.2 *Lines of operations*

When an operational commander goes through the OPP, he will define, on the basis of the identified decisive points (DP), the lines of operations for the proposed operation. They reflect the relationship between the various DPs and as such display the various activities within a unit. They should be established with precision so that the unit's full potential can be exploited. A good overview and optimum synchronisation are crucial in this respect.

#### 4.5.1.3 *Deconfliction*

In his battlespace management, the operational commander has to ensure that the actions of the various attached units are integrated and that they do not hinder one another. He should, if necessary, take steps to avoid conflicting actions or nip them in the bud. Subordinate commanders could nevertheless be surprised by actions by adjacent troops, giving rise to the risk of casualties as a result of friendly fire (blue on blue and/or collateral damage). The operational commander must make every possible effort to avoid this. He must, therefore, create the conditions for an effective deconfliction process. It is also crucial that the identity of each contact is established quickly and reliably and the commander has various means at his disposal for doing so<sup>44</sup>. Although in practice deconfliction takes place at the tactical level, its effects make it extremely important for the operational level. Incidents of blue-on-blue or collateral damage are always controversial and often provoke national and international criticism. Such incidents often undermine the legitimacy of the operation in question. All actions in which there is any question of this must, therefore, be investigated openly and fairly and there must not be any attempt to conceal any mistakes. A proper media strategy should form part of the process.

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<sup>44</sup> *Airspace control management (air), combat ID (land), water space management (sea).*

#### 4.5.1.4 Synchronisation

The operational commander will normally decide on the main effort and will concentrate his assets/effects accordingly. He will accept that there will be less power available at other places within his units, but will retain the option of relocating troops if the situation so requires. The speed with which he does that will partly determine the chances of success. A high operational tempo could increase those chances, but would actually complicate the synchronisation of the joint forces at the various levels.

The synchronisation of the joint forces is conditional on a precise determination of the operations areas for the various components. Within these operations areas, the respective component commanders (CCs) are the supported commanders and, as such, responsible for the prioritization and timing within the entire area of operations (AOO). Means such as fire support coordination measures (FSCM) and the associated procedures are available to component commanders to support effective actions and to increase the security of friendly forces. FSCM also serve to protect troops, the local population, infrastructure and religious or cultural objects.

The ultimate operational results depend not only on the joint forces. The intended effects are achieved with more than just these assets; aspects such as info ops, public affairs (PA), CIMIC and so on are vitally important in this respect. As soon as the JOA has been established, the JFC will assume responsibility for all PA activities in this area. In order to coordinate these activities, there are regular meetings of a multifunctional committee which comprises representatives from the operational, intelligence and CIMIC domains, as well as the LEGAD and the POLAD, supplemented by ad-hoc members. The agreed PA strategy should be consistent with the guidelines from higher up, in order to thus guarantee a synchronised and coherent approach. There may also be a need for the formation of a working group together with IOs, NGOs and other organisations active in the mission area.

Synchronisation matrices are an important aid in these activities; they provide a general insight into activities that have to be performed in a certain sequence and relationship with each other. Potentially conflicting actions can thus be identified quickly. This synchronisation requires good communications assets and proper liaison in order to avoid undesirable collateral damage or effects. All actors should in principle have access to these means, although specific military communications equipment will be hard to come by and will have to be deployed with discretion.

#### 4.5.2 Battle rhythm

The day-to-day work routine of an operational staff is referred to as the 'battle rhythm'. Meetings, briefings, discussions, etc, form part of a continuous routine and thus ensure an optimum tempo for all levels in the unit. Battle rhythm is the vital mechanism needed to ensure that simultaneous actions can be properly synchronised and integrated. It endorses the principle of centralised (strategic) planning and decentralised (tactical) execution. Battle rhythm is not determined by the speed of the information flow. When an operation starts, the battle rhythm needs to be established as quickly as possible and applied in the most effective manner. Battle rhythm is based on hierarchy, whereby a balance is specified each day between activities at headquarters level and activities lower in the chain of command. It can be changed during the course of an operation, but this should be done with restraint.

The following structures are normally found in an operational headquarters.

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- Meetings of boards, chaired by the commander, chief of staff or other senior official, with participation by representatives of all major staff elements. These meetings are of a decision-making nature.
- Specialist centres of a permanent nature which, with their own staff, look after a particular task within a headquarters.
- Planning teams, multifunctional staff elements which are formed for a specific purpose. They are not permanent and will be disbanded on completion of the task.
- Working groups, with the task of conducting analyses for a specific function. They could consist of a core group with representatives of the different components and are chaired by a J-official. These working groups can be permanent or temporary and can support several planning teams.

Generally speaking, these structures are multifunctional in terms of both participants and tasks.

#### 4.5.2.1 Briefings and meetings

The following briefings and meetings are indicative and are based on NATO operations<sup>45</sup>. The composition depends on the operation and can, therefore, vary. A commander, who after all determines his own battle rhythm, may also decide to deal with certain matters in other (ad-hoc) fora.

**Commander's update.** This briefing forms the basis for the start of the daily cycle. The operational commander is briefed in detail about the elapsed and forthcoming short-term periods (the guideline is twenty-four hours) and more generally about the longer term. This briefing is provided by the outgoing staff rotation and attended by as many of the incoming staff members as possible. The commander will close the briefing, normally stressing his main priorities once again. After the briefing, the chief of staff may deal with certain aspects in more detail.



<sup>45</sup> See Allied Joint Publication-3 Joint Operations.

**Joint Coordination Board (JCB).** This is the operational commander's main meeting. Here, the macro-aspects of the operational deployment of the coalition will be discussed, with the emphasis on synchronisation and priorities and on resolving potential conflicts. The JCB usually meets once a day and as a minimum comprises the JFC, chief of staff, component commanders (in person or via video conferencing, or VTC), liaison officers, POLAD, LEGAD, J3, J5 and any other officials relevant at the time. It is also advisable to have the chairmen of the other meetings in attendance so that they can obtain at first hand any information relevant to them.

The operational commander will steer the JCB, while the latter in turn will assign executive responsibilities, specify priorities and deconflict and synchronise tactical activities. This will ensure that information operations as well as the targeting process are properly coordinated and geared to the commander's intent. The JCB will pass the joint objectives to the components and determine the supporting/supported relationships. It will also revise where necessary the target priorities, restrictions and assignment of troops. Other responsibilities are shown below.

- Checking the joint coordination order (JCO) and advising the operational commander accordingly. Resolving conflicts in the supported/supporting relationships.
- Making proposals for the composition of and relationships between CCs and issuing directives for troops not attached to subordinate commanders, such as the operational reserve.
- Checking and advising the operational commander on all products of the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), information operations coordination board (IOCB) and other fora.
- Assigning strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) units to the right CC and keeping an overview in respect of their contribution to the joint targeting process.
- Checking and advising the operational commander on the recommendations of the air component commander (ACC) regarding the apportionment of his air assets.
- Direct battlespace management to ensure deconfliction between the various components.

The JCB is supported by the JCB working group (JCBWG), which is responsible for all necessary coordination with functional specialists of the units involved in the JCB. It is the JCB's counterpart at working level and thus accelerates the development and coordination process of the JCO.

**Joint Force Operational Planning Group Meeting (JFOPG).** The aim of this meeting is to refine the operations plan, monitor the activities of the various units and issue guidelines for any contingency plans. The meeting is chaired by the head of J5 and attended by the other heads of J1-9, possibly assisted by functional specialists.

**Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCB).** The operational commander may form an organisational element to deal with the targeting task, but he could also assign this responsibility to a subordinate commander. He may choose to form a JTCB, chaired by the chief of staff and with representatives from the JFC, the JF components and national liaisons. This JTCB integrates the relevant targeting aspects, checks the target information, develops guidelines for targeting, sets priorities and draws up the joint integrated prioritised target list (JIPTL). This list will at all times be submitted to the operational commander for approval before action is undertaken. During operations, the JTCB keeps a list of potential targets up to date, as well as an overview of the areas in which special operating forces (SOF) are active, in order to avoid jeopardising ongoing operations.

**Information Operations Coordination Board (IOCB).** The IOCB, chaired by the info ops chief, coordinates the info ops within the JOA, formulates the information strategy and provides the input in this field for the JCB and the JTCB. The IOCB also performs a liaison task with, for example, the public affairs officer (PAO), CIMIC officials and the LEGAD, as well as with subordinate units. The IOCB also coordinates with external organisations such as the United Nations, the International Red Cross and other IOs/NGOs.

**Other meetings.** There are other meetings besides those listed above, some of an incidental nature, but also some that are structural. They have a more corporate character and coordinate the staff's activities under the leadership of the chief of staff, who decides on the necessity of these meetings. The main aims are:

- to establish a minimum control mechanism necessary for the operational activities;
- to prevent a situation in which there is too little joint collaboration; this is done by encouraging the exchange of information.

The relative significance of the various meetings depends on the type, the scale and the intensity of the operation. Humanitarian operations, for example, will have less in the way of JTCB input, but will involve more CIMIC aspects. The battle rhythm is therefore inherently flexible. The starting point must be to spend as little time as possible on meetings.

The figure below shows an example of battle rhythm at JFC level. At other levels, the principle remains the same, but the participating levels will differ.




Figure 4-3 'Battle rhythm'

#### 4.5.2.2 Reports

Alongside the various meetings, periodic reports constitute a main task in the battle rhythm. Annex 4-3 contains a non-exhaustive list of the various reports.

#### 4.5.2.3 Routine influences on battle rhythm

No process runs in practice exactly as it is set out in theory. It is, therefore, extremely important that all those involved have a good understanding of the battle rhythm and are able to anticipate deviations. The chief of staff plays a key role in this respect. Deviations could, for instance, take the form of extra meetings, briefings, requests for information, or the need to produce an incident report. The following factors also affect the battle rhythm.

- **Time zones.** In large-scale, multinational operations, the various staffs may be separated geographically, in different time zones. The different battle rhythms must then be attuned to each other (as far as possible) and the varying requirements for information covered (as far as possible).
- **Political considerations.** Because military actions take place after political approval has been given, the supply of accurate and timely information to and from the political level is essential. An important factor here is the media. Occasionally, the political level is already aware of incidents through the media, while the reporting through military channels has not yet been completed. That is why incidents must be reported immediately, even if not all the facts are known at the time.
- **International influences.** The international environment of coalition operations generates more briefings. The timing of briefings to international authorities or organisations such as the UN or the OSCE and also to coalition partners has a significant impact on the battle rhythm. At the highest levels, these briefings may even become the commander's main activity. Partly for this reason, it is advisable to appoint not only a commander but also a deputy commander, who will concentrate primarily on internal affairs..
- **Replacement shifts.** It is recommended that replacement shifts be done in two stages, so that half the shift can still guarantee continuity. Replacement shifts, split or otherwise, in the various entities must take place before the commander's update, thus producing as seamless a transfer as possible between the outgoing and incoming shifts and ensuring continuity in the situational awareness.

- **Human factors.** Prolonged and complex military operations place heavy demands on personnel. Sufficient rest and relaxation and, where possible, recuperation leave are, therefore, essential for the sustainability of a unit. Insufficient rest will inevitably lead to diminished alertness and this will have an adverse effect on the staff's performance. A good balance between work and rest is thus extremely important. A good commander will keep an eye on this and will be aware of the potential effect on the unit's morale.
- **Media.** Media deadlines, particularly those just before the morning and evening news blocks, are an important factor in the battle rhythm. News reports often function as input for staff work, to either disprove them or lead to supporting information. Media representatives should, therefore, be consciously and regularly updated on the state of affairs. An open, honest and professional attitude on the part of commanders as well as other defence personnel will serve to establish a proactive and positive relationship with journalists. Military personnel should at all times be aware that the independent media cannot be regulated.



Every effort should be made, however, to achieve a 'unity of message', whereby media reporting will be in line with the strategic communication messages from the defence organisation. In some cases, journalists can be embedded in operational units.

- **Visits.** Headquarters, international or national, usually receive frequent visits from civil and military dignitaries, accompanied by press representatives. These visits often interfere with the daily rhythm. Separate briefings usually have to be arranged or groups have to be escorted. Efforts must be made to ensure that these visits are as unobtrusive as possible for the various staffs.

#### 4.5.2.4 *Incident management and accelerated battle rhythm*

It is inevitable that things will not always go according to plan, and it is the role of the chief of staff to lead his staff in such a way as to ensure that they can anticipate and respond to unexpected events. A summary of these events is given below.

- **Major incidents.** Major incidents will normally be reported via the chain of command. Media reporting, however, determines to an ever-increasing extent the speed with which such incidents are reported to the public. What can be defined as a 'major incident' has to be determined in advance and may vary from operation to operation. The definition will change in the course of the operation, as major events at the beginning of the campaign may be less relevant later on.
- If a major incident occurs, an incident team will be set up with the task of monitoring developments relating to the incident and reporting them accordingly. The team will be staffed with liaison officers from the subordinate units involved. For certain incidents, such as the loss of an aircraft, large numbers of casualties or fratricide, there are existing procedures governing the course of action. In other incidents, action is taken as is deemed necessary. Another important task for the incident team is to keep the relevant commanders informed at all times.
- **Media briefings.** All incidents generate a need for information, sometimes even at the level of the North Atlantic Council. This information often has to be available at very short notice and might have to be communicated by means of a media briefing. In exceptional circumstances or in extreme time pressure, the operational commander will report incidents directly to the most senior military leaders. If reports have to be contested, action should be taken to refute factual inaccuracies in media reports or to counter any accusations.

This takes place mainly at the political/military level, but could also occur in the mission area itself, where the journalists involved can be addressed directly.

The formulation of a media strategy takes place at JFC level. This strategy is then made available to all levels, so that unity of the media message can be guaranteed.

- **National public information.** Reports about incidents involving a single country should be made by that country itself in accordance with national legislation. The official views of, for instance, NATO will only be made known after coordination with whoever is primarily responsible for public information in the country in question. If several countries are involved, the primary reporting is done by the coalition, whereby the countries involved may give information about national aspects of the incident, such as the names of any casualties.

#### 4.5.2.5 *Harmonising battle rhythms of subordinate units*


The operational tempo of the components may vary. It falls to the chief of staff to harmonise the requirements of the various planning cycles and to synchronise them in order to maximise synergy. Liaison officers play a key role in this coordination.

### 4.5.3 **Situational awareness**

#### 4.5.3.1 *Shared situational awareness*

For a good synchronisation of the intended strategy and the adjustment of this strategy during the execution, as well as for the proper deployment of the available means of power, a shared situational awareness is essential. This is broader than the old familiar picture of the environment; it also includes a common understanding of the situation and an assessment of the effects and the relationship between the different effects. It makes the decision-making process easier, enables effective leadership of the operational activities and thus contributes to the overall effectiveness of the coalition. It supports the coordination and synchronisation of military actions and is a core component of force protection.

The requirement for a shared situational awareness will vary for each level and for each headquarters, although many systems and outlines are identical. The correct interpretation and use of the available information is the key to a shared situational awareness. This should ensure that all friendly units know where their own troops are, where the enemy is and where neutral parties are located. Furthermore, the intentions and the freedoms and restrictions of action will also be known.



In general terms, a shared situational awareness consists of the following elements.

- The joint common operational picture (JCOP).
- The status and possible intentions of the opponent.
- The status, readiness and sustainability of friendly troops.
- The locations and actions of other relevant groups in the JOA.
- Information about the physical environment (geographical, meteorological, oceanographic and hydrographic). The ultimate aim of the common operational picture is not for all to have the same picture but for all to have the same perception of the situation. The environmental picture needs to be presented in such a way as to generate a common understanding on the part of the players in respect of the situation and the required actions.

#### 4.5.3.2 Ways to promote shared situational awareness

There are various options for promoting shared situational awareness and thus simplifying the synchronisation or deconfliction of actions. A few examples are given below.

- **Information management (IM).** IM is the process of dealing effectively with all forms of incoming and outgoing information, as well as the flow of information within headquarters. To make this possible, the friendly information requirement, and as far as possible that of the opponent, must be clear. The aim is to get the right information to the right place at the right time and in the right form. The chief of staff supervises this process, but it is conducted by communications specialists. In addition, all J-sections do similar work for the commander and for the staff officers, insofar as their requirements come from the information requirement set by the commander. It goes without saying that good coordination with the information managers in J2 section is vital.
- **Synchronisation matrix.** Synchronisation matrices are an important aid which provide a general insight into activities that have to be performed in a certain sequence and relationship with each other. Potentially conflicting actions can also be identified quickly in this way.
- **Mission rehearsal.** At each level, a much-used training method is a walk-through-talk-through, in which at least all the key personnel take part. It is recommended that as many as possible of those involved also take part if operations security (OPSEC) allows. This is in effect an oral training, in which those involved familiarise themselves with the role they are actually going to play. They will also see the effect of their actions on those of others. This sort of training also involves the participation of a team that plays the role of the adversary and contributes from that perspective.
- **Mission Essential Checklists.** A mission-essential checklist is a detailed matrix of actions or series of actions in which go/no-go criteria of individual actions are incorporated. Here, too, actions are specified which could lead to the end of a mission. The list is usually encrypted to ensure OPSEC as well as simplicity.

- **Wargaming.** Wargaming should not merely be regarded as an aid to careful planning; it can be used in any phase of an operation and it can take account of a great many contingencies. This makes it a special form of operational analysis for the commander's decision making. Wargaming is normally based on the 'action-and-consequence' model and is often supported by computer programmes. The results of wargaming must, however, be meticulously evaluated in order to judge their real value.

#### 4.5.4 *Joint targeting*

This section gives a general overview of the targeting process. Targeting is 'the process of selecting and prioritising targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities' (AAP-6). For detailed information about targeting, please refer to AJP 3.9 Joint targeting.



The effectiveness with which kinetic and non-kinetic means can be used to attack strategic and operational targets is increasing all the time. There is also an ever-increasing degree of political control over the use of these means.

The relationship between the target selection, the political objectives and the commander's intent is, therefore, crucial. Target selection from that point of view ensures that the means used are relevant and, above all, are deployed efficiently. This deployment must occur within the confines of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and within the agreed rules of engagement. When an operation is being planned, the desired strategic and operational end state must be central in the selection of targets. A good estimation of the political repercussions is also essential; success or failure in this area can be just as decisive for an operation as the actual offensive. Targeting must also be effective in military terms and, as part of the decision-making process, must be synchronised and deconflicted with other actions in the OPLAN.

#### 4.5.4.1 *The targeting process*

Targeting is the process conducted in order to:

- establish what effects are needed to achieve the commander's intent;
- identify what actions are necessary for this, based on the means available;
- synchronise relevant capabilities and set priorities;
- estimate the cumulative effect in terms of the commander's intent and make any necessary corrections;
- establish the potential negative effects and identify measures to be taken to avoid them.

Targeting takes place at the operational and component level as well as unit level and is vital for the synchronised use of joint fires and other means. The process is directed by the joint force commander (JFC) and is determined in broad terms by friendly capabilities and the threat posed by the enemy. Targeting takes place at all planning levels, while the target engagement is carried out by units of all components, as long as they have the right capabilities. Target engagement is in principle carried out with kinetic and non-kinetic means, with every effort being made to achieve the effects established beforehand. These could be, for example, destruction, neutralisation or suppression, but could also take the form of wider, less tangible consequences.

An effective and efficient target selection process and a good planning cycle for operations form vital elements in the execution of joint operations. The joint targeting process has to integrate the capacities and efforts of national, multinational and joint forces, taking account of distinguishing capacities and requirements. Although the degree of political control can vary from case to case, the process itself is in principle similar for all types of conflict.

#### 4.5.4.2 Levels of target selection

Target selection takes place at strategic, operational and tactical level. By using a mix of capacities, targets can be engaged sequentially or in parallel at all these levels.

- **Strategic targets.** Strategic operations are primarily designed to change the opponent's behaviour by means of direct or indirect attacks on his centres of gravity. Strategic targets can consist of physical military and civil targets, or could also be the desired effects resulting from info ops or psyops campaigns or from economic and/or political measures. If civil targets (often static) are selected, such as industry or infrastructure, there will be a risk of escalation, which is partly why the engagement of strategic targets generally requires political approval.
- **Operational targets** are closely related to the enemy's military potential and can be static or dynamic in nature, or a desired effect, and are always designed to bring about an intended change in behaviour. To attack operational targets, the commander in principle has access to kinetic and non-kinetic means. When kinetic means are used, air power is deployed in many cases, often in collaboration with land forces and augmented by special forces. The engagement of static or dynamic operational targets generally occurs deep in enemy territory. In cases of an attack on operational targets close to civil objects, there is a risk of collateral damage so any engagement of that nature is heavily influenced by political and/or legal considerations.
- **Tactical targets** generally consist of military or non-military components which directly enable the opponent to influence the course of the localised fighting. In the engagement of tactical targets in particular, the integrated collaboration of all relevant components is highly important.

#### 4.5.4.3 Targeting cycle

The cyclic process of target selection begins with the issue of the order and directives from the JFC. The following cycle is then put in motion:

- the requirement of the components;
- the prioritisation of requirements;
- determining the target or target systems;
- the allocation of means;
- engagement of the targets;
- evaluation of the damage;
- establishing the JFC's follow-up directives for the next cycle.

During the targeting cycle, the JFC's objectives and directives are supplemented with intelligence data and operational information to select specific targets and decide on the means with which the desired effect can be achieved by attacking the targets. National governments or higher headquarters may impose political directives, restrictions and priorities on the JFC. The components determine their own requirements in respect of target engagement, which could be outside their area of operations or for which their own means may be insufficient. After the official target list has been drawn up by the JFC and the means have been allocated, the component commanders will proceed with the planning and execution of the target engagement.

#### 4.5.4.4 Types of targeting

Targeting is divided into deliberate and dynamic targeting.

- **Deliberate targeting.** This is an attack on known targets in the operational area with planned actions. Examples range from targets on the joint target lists in the campaign plan to targets established early enough to be included in the ATO. There are two different sub-categories:
  - **Scheduled.** Targeting where actions must be taken at a specified time.
  - **On-call.** Targeting where the timing of the action is not specified in advance.



- **Dynamic targeting.** This is an attack on targets that were established too late to be included in the above cycle. Also for dynamic targets, there are two sub-categories:
  - **Anticipated.** Attack on targets of which the existence is known, but which have not yet been detected or which were not selected early enough for inclusion in the deliberate targeting cycle;
  - **Unanticipated.** Attack of initially unknown targets which, when discovered, meet the commander's targeting criteria

#### 4.5.4.5 Time-sensitive targets (TST)<sup>46</sup>

A TST is a target that must be attacked immediately as it represents an immediate or highly imminent threat to friendly operations or is an extremely attractive target of opportunity. The time available does not then allow the whole of the normal procedure to be followed and the JFC will issue specific guidelines on how to proceed.

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<sup>46</sup> TST is also the abbreviation for time-sensitive targeting, the procedure used to determine how time-sensitive targets will be attacked.

## 4.6 Decision making in the assessment stage

### 4.6.1 Aim of assessment

Assessment, defined as ‘the determination of progress, based on subjective and objective level measurements, to support the decision making’, is a fundamental aspect of a successful operation. It creates an opportunity to monitor continuously the situation and the progress of the operation. In a dynamic environment, assessment provides support for the commander in the deliberations he makes before taking decisions on the rest of the operation. As a specified step in the cyclic decision-making process, constant assessment must take place at the various levels of a military organisation.

Just as the desired effects are specified during the planning, so too must be the assessment criteria. The way in which insight will be given into the results must also be specified. This does not mean, though, that assessment should be the lead process; it supports the decision-making process, but no more than that. Empirical, objective evidence is not always available, or perhaps there is no means to obtain it. In such cases, the use of assessment criteria is incorrect. Above all, therefore, the subjective opinion of the commander, based on his experience and feel for the situation, remains crucial and dominant. Furthermore, assessment must not degenerate into a purely mechanical process. It requires assessment skills and a considered military opinion, based on sufficient information. The temptation to develop assessment methods that are unnecessarily complex and which lay a disproportionate claim on staff capacity must be resisted.

### 4.6.2 Assessment and campaigning

There are three forms of assessment: measurement of activity (MOA), measurement of effect (MOE) and campaign effectiveness assessment (CEA). Each of these forms contributes to campaigning in three ways:

- **Initial campaign planning.** Assessment during the initial planning phase creates a detailed understanding of the possible desired effects and can also serve as a means to validate the process.
- **Iterative planning.** Assessment supports iterative planning as soon as the operation has begun. It enables the commander to give timely amended orders and provides him with the opportunity to adapt quickly to changing circumstances.
- **New situation.** Assessment also has a wider function: the validation of the initial planning considerations and the establishment of any changes therein. It also deepens awareness of the operational environment on the part of the commander and his staff.

#### 4.6.3 Assessment as an operational art

Just as other elements of campaigning, assessment is an expression of operational art. Successful assessment is thus an integral part of the skill set that a commander needs to possess.

The established synchronisation of activities for an operation is almost entirely adjustable on the basis of assessment results. A commander must then decide which aspects of the operation will benefit from the assessment results, the availability of assets being an important factor in determining whether any adjustment should be made. This process requires a creative spirit on the part of the commander, open to different options.

Assessment supports the commander's decision-making process. This is further determined in part by his broader take on the situation, personal attitude towards subordinates and representatives of other organisations involved, and by the opinions of his superiors. A critical review and consideration of assessment results is thus an important part of the wider decision-making process.

#### 4.6.4 Campaign design and management

The staff is responsible for designing and managing the operation of which the assessment forms part.

- **Planning assessment.** While the commander formulates guidelines and directs the processes to be evaluated, the staff is responsible for the detailed planning of the assessment process itself.
- **Collecting and recording assessment data.** Subordinate commanders are responsible for the collection and subsequent submission of data for the assessment process at operational level. Use will also be made of input from the higher level and from relevant (international) organisations.
- **Evaluation of assessment data.** The evaluation of assessment data is monitored by the commander. To be able to do this properly requires expertise and an extensive knowledge of assessment techniques, but military evaluation skills must ultimately be the deciding factor. An objective evaluation of media reporting, in combination with an analysis of the public support for the mission, is extremely important in determining the media strategy and any necessary adjustments thereof.

- **Assessment as support for decision making.** Assessment serves to support military decision making and must, therefore, be tailored accordingly.

#### 4.6.5 Dealing with assessment at a headquarters

The way in which headquarters handle assessment depends on the type of operation and the means available. In multinational operations, the circumstances are different and probably trickier than in the case of national operations. This is because assessment data has to be collected for both national and international purposes, which may give rise to different angles of approach. In such cases, a commander must make clear beforehand to the parties involved what can and cannot be done in order to keep the assessment process as simple and as transparent as possible.

#### 4.6.6 Lessons learned

Lessons learned (LL) are permanent improvements in combat power based on past experience. The LL process relates to both current and future operations and its aim is to learn continuous and structural lessons from experience. The process must be properly directed. LL can lead to the confirmation or improvement of existing doctrines, organisation, materiel, training, etc.

The LL process is based on observations. These observations, or 'lessons identified', are the observed effects of activities that have been performed. The collection and analysis of the observations forms the core of the LL process. The analysis should generate a deeper understanding whereby value judgements are to be avoided as much as possible in order to arrive at a picture that is as objective as it can be. Given the diverse (cultural) perspectives, that is particularly important in a multinational setting.

From the outset, commanders have to create the conditions for the collection of observations and the start-up of an LL process at all levels. Responsibility for directing this process and processing the results lies at military-strategic level.

#### 4.6.7 Recording

The recording of operational actions by the Netherlands armed forces is important for the subsequent systematic, application-based study and for the supply of information about those actions to the political and civil leaders of the Ministry of Defence. This applies fully to all operations involving the participation of the Netherlands armed forces or individual military personnel. Recording is taken to mean the normal archiving process, supplemented by special arrangements.

Together, they ensure that a full and reliable reconstruction of the course of the operation will be possible from documents after the event. Lessons can also be drawn from this for subsequent deployment of Netherlands military personnel. CHOD Directive A-1201 sorts out the special arrangements for recording during all operations in the sense of national administrative attachment.

As well as the recording described above, the Director of Operations may, in consultation with the coordinating operational command and the Netherlands Institute of Military History, decide that a diarist be assigned to an operation. This diarist will form part of the staff and will take part in all staff meetings and briefings. CHOD Directive A-157 contains further specifications regarding the role of the diarist. Lastly, CHOD Directive A-158 sets requirements for the archiving process during operations.

## Annex 1-1

### Generic multinational C2 structures

In multinational operations, there are in principle three different generic models for the organisation of C2 and the force: fully integrated, framework nation and lead nation. Each of these models has a different degree of multinationality. The models are flexible in their application and are used in operations by NATO, the EU and the UN. The choice of model and elements in the C2 structure is determined by various factors.

- **Availability.** Do the international organisation, the coalition or the participating nations have the necessary C2 elements and will these actually be available at the required time? Are participating nations willing to make their capabilities available?
- **Political factors.** The 'flag' flying above the force or the headquarters is extremely important for the (political) support in the mission area and at home. A lead nation might be capable of quickly supplying a complete C2 framework with the necessary commanders, but that might not be desirable for reasons of political sensitivity.
- **Speed.** The speed of the required deployment will determine the nature of the C2 structure. In the case of rapid deployment, such as initial entry, an existing and well-trained headquarters is often the best option. In the case of a prolonged operation in a more stable situation, a possible option would be the phased rotation of an international composite headquarters.

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#### 1.1 Fully integrated

A fully integrated force is based on a bi- or multinational proportional distribution of units and personnel, augmented by national components and a fully integrated headquarters. A fully integrated headquarters will usually come from the existing NATO command structure or will be created for and tailored to the operation in question. The working language and procedures will have been agreed by the participating nations in advance and the commanders of fully integrated multinational formations will normally be appointed on a rotational basis.

#### 1.2 Lead nation

One country will assume responsibility for the planning and execution of the operation. The lead nation will usually also supply the commander, the staff and the C2 systems and will take care of the logistic coordination. The lead nation's doctrine usually applies. Other nations can assign troops to the force and hold positions in the staff.

### **1.3 Framework nation**

With this model, one country supplies the framework for the required C2 structure and troops. The main elements of the staff and the headquarters will come from that framework nation. The working language and procedures are based on NATO standards.

## Annex 2-1

### Command and support relationships

#### General

Command authority enables a military commander to give orders to his subordinate commanders or units for the execution of his own assignment. The mutual relationships and the level of authority involved will be specifically defined. It will thus be clear what orders can and cannot be given and what degree of freedom there is for deploying a unit within a given assignment. Command authority specifically does not of itself allow the commander to give units orders which do not come within his own area of assignment or responsibility. If responsibility for deploying the armed forces rests with the most senior military commander, he will be referred to as the commander in chief. This is not the case in the Netherlands, as the supreme authority over the armed forces rests with the government and, on behalf of the government, with the Minister of Defence.

Command authority will often only be established after an operational analysis and in relation to the means, capacities and tasks assigned to commanders or units. The following principles apply here.

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- Command authority only applies between two commanders or between a commander and a unit.
- Most forms of command authority can occur at all levels. A command authority at one level has no relation to command authorities at other levels in the hierarchical line. In other words, both higher and lower command authorities can occur higher or lower in the line.
- Command authority relates purely to the depth of the orders that can be given to units or commanders, not to the intent of the orders. For the latter, the commander must keep to his own task. For example, a commander with FULLCOM authority over his sub-units can give any form of order, as long as they lie within the extension of his own task. In short, orders can only be given within a commander's own area of responsibility, as specified in the order received from the competent authority for whom the military deployment is taking place.

### NATO command relationships

NATO's definitions of command relationships are given below.<sup>47</sup>

- **Full Command (FULLCOM)** is the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Nations that assign forces to a NATO operation will always retain FULLCOM of those forces. Generally FULLCOM will not be assigned to a designated NATO Commander and applies normally within national forces.
- **Operational Command (OPCOM)** is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units and to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as it may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.
- **Operational Control (OPCON)** is the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks, which are usually limited by function, time, or location and to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control to those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
- **Tactical Command (TACOM)** is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. Tactical Control.
- **Tactical Control (TACON)** is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
- **Administrative Control (ADCON)** is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other matters not included in the operational mission of the subordinate or other organizations.

<sup>47</sup> Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) – 6.

- **Logistic Control (LOGCON)** is that authority granted to a NATO Commander over assigned logistics units and organizations in the JOA, including National Support Elements (NSE) that empowers him to synchronize, prioritize, and integrate their logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint mission. It does not confer authority over the nationally owned resources held by an NSE, except as agreed in the TOA or in accordance with the NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics.
- **Coordinating Authority (CA)** is the authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.
- **Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH)**<sup>48</sup>

The table below shows an overview of the NATO command relationships and the relevant authorities.<sup>49</sup>

### National interpretations

When a force is assembled and command relationships determined, all parties' actual interpretation of the authorities must be clear in advance. Although the NATO command relationships form the starting points and are widely accepted within NATO, the criteria on the basis of which they are defined are not identical. This means that the descriptions are open to different interpretations and there could be minor differences between countries or organisations (EU, UN).

<sup>48</sup> The abbreviation DIRLAUTH only appears in AAP-15 NATO Abbreviations, and is defined as Direct Liaison Authorized. There is no definition of DIRLAUTH in AAP-6. The US JP-1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces defines DIRLAUTH as 'that authority granted by a CDR (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the CDR granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised'.

<sup>49</sup> AJP 3 (A) en NATO Staff Handbook

Authority	Most Control					Least Control				
	FULL CMD	NATO OPCOM	NATO OPCON	NATO TACOM	NATO TACON	FULL CMD	NATO OPCOM	NATO OPCON	NATO TACOM	NATO TACON
Direct authority to deal with nations, diplomatic missions, agencies	X									
Granted to a command	X	X								
Delegated to a command			X	X	X					
Set chain of command to forces	X									
Assign mission/designate objective	X	X								
Assign tasks	X	X		X						
Direct/Employ forces	X	X	X							
Establish maneuver control measures	X	X	X	X	X					
Reassign forces	X									
Retain OPCON	X	X								
Delegate OPCON	X	X	X							
Assign TACON	X									
Delegate TACON	X	X	X							
Retain TACON	X	X	X							
Deploy forces (information/within theater)	X	X	X							
Local direction/control designated forces	X								X	
Assign separate <i>employment</i> of unit components	X	X								
Directive authority for logistics	X									
Direct joint training	X									
Assign/Reassign subordinate commanders/officers	X									
Conduct internal discipline/training	X									
The national authority always retains FULL COMMAND by Allied doctrine.						LEGEND OPCON - Operational Control OPCOM - Operational Command TACOM - Tactical Command TACON - Tactical Control				
 - has this authority  - denied authority or not specially granted										

It is, therefore, advisable to consult the higher commander in the event of any doubt as to the exact command relationship or responsibilities. For the Netherlands, the following interpretations and definitions (CHOD A-300) apply in principle:

- **FULLCOM.** Highest military authority, empowered to command units in general terms.
- **OPCOM.** Authority to assign **missions**, allocate **tasks** and issue **orders to units** and to divide, deploy and assemble the unit.
- **OPCON.** Authority to assign **tasks** and issue **orders** to the unit to realise the objectives within the mission stated by the higher commander. OPCON can be delegated. It does not include responsibility for personnel service support or logistics.
- **TACOM.** Authority to issue **orders** to a unit for the realisation of this unit's higher commander's set tasks within the unit's stated mission. TACOM can be delegated.
- **TACON.** Authority to coordinate a unit's activities in time and space for the realisation of an order given to this unit by its higher commander within the stated task and mission.
- **Administrative Control (ADCON).** This is the authority, to be specified further, over units in respect of administrative matters such as personnel management, supplies and services.
- **Coordinating Authority (CA).** Authority to coordinate. Previously agreed activities will be discussed. It does not mean that agreement can be forced; if there is a difference of opinion, the higher level will be informed
- **Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH).** Term which gives permission for internal synchronisation, with the obligation to keep the granting authority informed about the synchronisation.

### **Command relationships with national civil authorities**

The deployment of military capacities for national operations will almost always take place in support of civil authorities<sup>50</sup>.

Military personnel and units operate here under the control of the authorities<sup>51</sup>. The following arrangements apply in respect of the command relationships.

- CHOD retains FULLCOM at all times.
- The Director of Operations has OPCOM over the units of the Operational Commands.
- The Director of Operations assigns units to civilian authorities and delegates TACOM to them.
- The commander of military means acts as the red card holder (usually commander of the regional military command; Flag Officer (Caribbean) in the case of the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands).

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### **Transfer of Authority (TOA)**

When the joint multinational force is formed, units will at some stage have to come under the authority of the designated commander. The transfer of authority (TOA) must be an integral part of the analysis and planning prior to deployment. Also during the execution of the operation, up to and including completion, the TOA must continue to be an area of attention. The earlier the TOA occurs, the more opportunities the commander will have to integrate the unit into the force. The commander will also have more opportunities for coordinated movements to and arrival and deployment in the mission area.

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<sup>50</sup> National operations can be divided as follows:

- Military assistance. Assistance to and at the request of civil authorities on the basis of the Police Act or the Disasters and Major Accidents Act, in which powers are invoked that are normally reserved exclusively for the civil authorities, such as the police and/or judiciary.

Requests for military assistance on the basis of the Police Act are divided into public order enforcement or criminal law enforcement.

- Military support. Support for, and at the request of civil authorities that is not prescribed by law but where the military capacities are necessary in the public interest.

- Host Nation Support. Support for allies' armed forces.

- Support for the public. Requests for support not submitted by a civil administrator, but by a society or association. (CHOD Directive A-300, 2005)

<sup>51</sup> Minister, Queen's Commissioner, governors of Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten, public prosecutor, mayor.

The starting point is that countries always retain FULLCOM over their national contingents. This TOA to an international commander is thus always restricted to the operational element of the authority. For Netherlands units attached to a multinational unit, the command authority and TOA will be set out in a specific CHOD operational directive. In principle, this will be OPCON. The TOA normally occurs at the beginning and the end of (participation in) an operation, although there could also be situations in which there are rapid and frequent TOAs, particularly in the event of the temporary deployment of scarce resources.

The term 'change of operational control' (CHOP) is relevant here. This is in effect a flexible method of TOA in the maritime domain, whereby a ship or group of ships are alternately attached to different commanders or even different operations or organisations.

#### Domain-specific support relationships

In situations where one unit (or group of units) needs to provide support for another, the commander who ordered the support must indicate to what extent, how and for how long this support should be provided. The supporting commander must also be advised of the situation and of the supported commander's mission. Because the joint operational commander needs to know what form of support relationships he can impose on his components, a number of domain-specific relationships are described below. The distinction between the tactical and operational level is not always clear in this respect.

#### Specific support relationship in the maritime domain

In the maritime domain, use is made of other forms of support besides the supporting/supported relationship<sup>52</sup>. These variant forms of support are particularly suited to units or formations which usually operate independently, such as submarines or maritime patrol aircraft, or which, because of the nature of the platform, can cover a large area and support several units operating in that area, such as airborne early warning (AEW) platforms, UAVs and alliance ground surveillance (AGS). These forms of support relationship for the maritime and air components are described below.

- **Direct support.** Direct support is the support provided by a unit or formation not attached or under command of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation. A unit assigned in direct support will operate under the TACON of the command that is being supported. OPCON and TACOM remain with the assigning authority.

<sup>52</sup> Reference: AJP-3.1 Allied Doctrine for Maritime Operations, Chapter 2 Section IV (Command during support operations).

- **Associated support.** A unit assigned in associated support operates independently of the supported force, but may be tasked to provide contact information to, and receive intelligence from, the command that is being supported. The designated unit operates under the TACON of the assigning authority who coordinates the tasking and movement of the supporting unit in response to the supported commander's requirements.
- **Area operations.** Area operations are normally conducted in a geographic area, not related to the protection of a specific force. Areas may be related to the protection of maritime forces scheduled to enter the area, or to provide defence in depth to distant forces. TACOM of units conducting area operations remains with the assigning authority.

#### Specific support relationships in the land domain

When engineer units are deployed, there are two support relationships.

- **General (engineer) support** is the task of supporting a unit as a whole.
- **Direct (engineer) support** is the task of giving priority support to a specific unit..

The concepts of general and direct support are also used in the deployment of ground-based fire support units. In that context:

- **General (fire) support** is the tactical order given to a fire support unit to provide fire support for the actions of a unit as a whole;
- **Direct (fire) support** is the tactical order given to a fire support unit to provide primary fire support at the request of a unit, without the existence of a command relationship. In the artillery, there is also the tactical assignment of **reinforcement**, whereby a fire support unit is given the tactical assignment of providing fire support for another fire support unit. The combination of general (fire) support and reinforcement is also seen on occasion.

## Terms specific to the Netherlands

### Single service manager (SSM)

Single service manager (SSM) is a term used specifically in the Netherlands in respect of the direction of joint forces. It is normally used in the context of the direction of forces in non-operational circumstances, but can also be significant in the preparation for deployment before the TOA has occurred. The SSM is a result of the fact that joint forces in the Ministry of Defence's management model cannot be placed directly under the CHOD in organisational terms. SSM is defined as follows: the commander or equivalent authority of the organisational element that is being organised, directed and managed. The single service manager in this definition means the commander of the Defence department which has had the joint organisational element allocated to its organisation. The joint organisational element is the formation, not specifically attributed to one part of the Defence organisation, which provides products and services for several parts of the Defence organisation, whereby officials from different Services can be deployed<sup>53</sup>.

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### Coordinating operational command

The coordinating operational command is the operational command that is empowered by the CHOD to act on behalf of and under the responsibility of the CHOD in implementing the interservice harmonisation for the logistic (personnel and materiel) preparation, deployment, maintenance, repatriation and completion of Netherlands units and/or individuals participating in international (peace) operations<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>53</sup> CHOD Directive A-811, *Process management and direction of joint organisational elements*, 14 October 2008.

<sup>54</sup> CHOD Directive A-100, *Introduction and terms*, 21 November 2008.

## Annex 4-1

### Types of plans and orders

Given below is a list of the most common types of plans and orders. The definitions and descriptions have for the most part been taken from the relevant NATO documents and are shown in their original form.

**Administrative order** An order covering traffic, supplies, maintenance, evacuation, personnel and other administrative details. (AAP-6)

**Administrative plan** A plan, normally relating to and complementing the operation plan or order, which provides information and instructions covering the logistic and administrative support of the operation. (AAP-6)

**Campaign Directive** Produced by J5, it provides the joint force mission, and the JTFC's campaign CONOPS. The latter includes his intent, scheme of manoeuvre (described to reflect the campaign end-state, CoG(s) and Decisive Conditions) and main effort. Associated campaign schematics, and direction on assessment, should also be included.

**Campaign Plan** A JFC should have a single plan, albeit this may be nested within a broader Comprehensive Approach, including:

- Analysis of the background to the crisis, as well as its causes, and any assumptions and limitations upon which planning is based.
- The mission and CONOPS (intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort).
- The assignment of Force Elements between components and prioritisation of logistic effort.
- C2 and liaison arrangements for the joint force, and arrangements for comprehensive, inter-agency coordination.

**Collection plan (CP)** A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. (AAP-6)

**Concept of operations.** A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission. (AAP-6). The JFC's CONOPS is the most important aspect of his campaign plan; it provides an enduring reference point to which subordinates can refer in order to confirm their understanding of commander's intent and to orientate themselves to their role in his overall scheme. In setting out his vision to subordinates, a JFC should also indicate to them what lies ahead, including the likely nature and scope of subsequent orders and plans. Clarity is vital; subordinate commanders need to understand a JFC's intentions in order to support his plan, to act purposefully and to respond effectively to changes in the situation. A JFC's concept of operation which runs to more than a side or 2 of paper is either too complex or has not been thought through sufficiently. While a JFC should have engaged with his superior commander throughout the planning process, he may nonetheless wish to confirm his proposed concept prior to promulgation, giving him an opportunity to endorse the plan formally and, if necessary, obtain political approval. A JFC's CONOPS are described at various level: campaign directive (the *what*), OPLAN (the *how*) and OPORD (task and *purpose*).

**Contingency plan (CONPLAN)** A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. (AAP-6)

**Draft plan** A plan for which a draft plan has been coordinated and agreed with the other military headquarters and is ready for coordination with the nations involved, that is those nations who would be required to take national action to support the plan. It may be used for future planning and exercises and may form the basis for an operation order to be implemented in time of emergency. (AAP-6)

**Force instruction document** It provides supplementary instructions and supporting information to the joint force; it complements the campaign directive, and subsequent OPLANs and OPORDs.

**Fragmentary order (FRAGO)** An abbreviated form of an operation order, issued as required, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. (AAP-6)

**Generic plan (GEP)** A basic plan which is developed for possible operations where some planning factors have not yet been fully identified or cannot be assumed. It identifies at this stage the general capabilities required. (AAP-6)

**Initiating directive (ID)** This defines the political context of an intended operation, as well as the political guidelines and parameters and the desired political and military strategic end state. It also contains supplementary instructions for the planning and preparation of a possible military operation. The ID is issued by the CDS; in NATO, it is the North Atlantic Council (NAC) which issues the NAC-ID.

**Joint coordination order (JCO)** It details the Commander's direction and guidance, assigns resources to CCs and synchronises operations. The release authority is the Commander.

**Operation order (OPORD)** A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6)

**Operation plan (OPLAN)** A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation "plan" is usually used instead of "order" in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (AAP-6)

**Operational general matters (OPGEN)** In maritime operations, the purpose of the OPGEN is to enable the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to promulgate general matter of policy, instructions and aspect common to all forms of warfare and detailed instructions for warfare responsibilities that the OTC retains. Certain general information required for the conduct of operations in one or more warfare areas may be found only in the OPGEN. Therefore, the OPGEN must be signalled for all operations/ exercises and must be addressed to all participants including not only units of the force, but also cooperating/ supporting commanders and units both afloat and ashore. (APP-11)

**Operational tasking (OPTASK)** In maritime operations, the purpose of an OPTASK is to promulgate detailed tasking and instructions for all aspects of a certain warfare area or support function (e.g. AAW (Anti-air warfare), AIR (aircraft), AMPHIB (amphibious operations), ASW (anti submarine warfare), COMMS (communications), EW (electronic warfare), LINK (tactical datalinks), LOG (logistic support), MCM (naval mine counter-measures), etc.). (APP-11)

**Order of battle transfer of authority sea (ORBATTOASEA)** In maritime operations, the ORBATTOASEA is used to transfer operational command and/or control from one authority to another. (APP-11)

**Planning guidance** An operational plan based on the ID and issued by D-OPS.

**Standing order** A promulgated order which remains in force until amended or cancelled. (AAP-6)

**Warning order** Warning orders indicate commander's intent to subordinates, who can then contribute to higher level planning and conduct their own planning from a position of knowledge. A JFC should strike a balance between providing too little information too late, and inundating subordinates with a succession of evolving, but potentially contradictory, directions. There is no prescribed format; warning orders are likely to become progressively more definitive as the planning process progresses.

## Annex 4-2


### The operational planning process (OPP)

The NATO Operational Planning Process (OPP) is designed to achieve standardisation in the planning process. It also guarantees the cohesion between the politico-strategic, military-strategic and operational levels. The model shows a method for translating directives from the higher level into concrete and feasible military objectives. In its crisis management system for dealing with a conflict, NATO distinguishes five phases:

- **Phase 1** – Indications and warnings of a potential or actual conflict.
- **Phase 2** – Assessment of the developing crisis situation, including the potential and actual consequences for NATO.
- **Phase 3** – Development of response options to support the decision making by the North Atlantic Council.
- **Phase 4** - Planning and execution of the decisions and directives.
- **Phase 5** – Return to stability.

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The OPP takes place in phases 2-5, as illustrated below<sup>55</sup>.




55 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning, AJP-5, ratification draft.2006



The OPP has five separate and successive phases<sup>56</sup>

- **Phase I - Initiation.** In this phase, the strategic level will investigate and determine whether operational planning should commence.
- **Phase II - Orientation.** In this phase, a situational analysis will be used to examine what needs to be done in order to implement the formulated directives.
- **Phase III – Concept development.** This phase is used to establish how the operation can be executed as effectively and efficiently as possible. Different courses of action (COA) will be developed and analysed for the execution of the operation, including the necessary assets. These COAs will be submitted to the commander, who will ultimately make his choice. This choice will form the basis for the development of a concept of operations (CONOPS) and the supporting statement of requirements (SOR), the two main products of this phase.
- **Phase IV – Plan development.** This phase will see the designation of the units who will be taking part in the operation. For these units, plans will be developed for transportation to the area of operations, as will plans for training, protection and, depending on the duration of the operation, sustainability. Coordination with other headquarters and countries will take place in this phase. The end result is a complete plan, or series of plans, including annexes for the various functional domains, approved by the competent authority.

<sup>56</sup> Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning, AJP-5, ratification draft 2006



- Phase V - Plan Review.** This phase ensures that the plan remains current and feasible: current in terms of emerging requirements, policy and doctrine, and feasible in terms of applicability and acceptance. This phase includes periodic reviews of the plan, possibly resulting in changes and/or new planning directives.

**NATO-EU cooperation**

On the basis of NATO-EU strategic cooperation and the implementation of the Berlin Plus agreement, the EU always has access in EU-led operations to the planning capacity of the NATO command structure. Standard procedures have been developed for this purpose.

DSACEUR, as the primary point of contact for the EU in respect of military-strategic matters, coordinates NATO's planning support, while keeping SACEUR fully informed. He will use all elements of NATO's military-strategic planning capacity and, if required, other elements of the NATO command structure.

The NATO planning support is fully in keeping with the NATO procedures as set out in MC 133/3, AJP-5 and the Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP).

## Annex 4-3

### Reports

Alongside the various meetings, periodic reporting is a main task in the battle rhythm. Given below is a non-exhaustive rundown of the various types of report. At lower levels, for example, frequent use is made of daily situational reports (SITREPS). Providing such reports is extremely time-intensive and the various staffs are also constantly involved in answering questions, clarifying issues, and so on, which could mean that this becomes more or less the staff's main activity. A chief of staff must, therefore, always assess this process with a critical eye. Questions which are posed purely out of curiosity or to which there is realistically no adequate response should be disregarded, thus ensuring that a staff is not overly distracted from the core tasks.

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- **Assessment report (ASSESSREP).** An ASSESSREP, used at the various levels within a coalition, is a daily rundown and assessment of the main developments. In NATO operations, Allied Command Operations (ACO) produces an ASSESSREP at the highest level, assessing the strategic situation. The information from the various ASSESSREPS is used in NATO to inform the North Atlantic Council. In the Netherlands, the political leaders are informed on the basis of this information.
- **Down Report (DOWNREP).** A DOWNREP is a daily report from the JFC to the CCs and other units. The aim of a DOWNREP is to keep the various units informed about the current situation. It contains information about the strategic decision-making process, operational matters, commander's intent and the activities of the different components. It also serves to clarify any problems that have been identified and reported in, for example, ASSESSREPs. The JFC in turn receives a DOWNREP from ACO.
- **Logistic, medical and personnel reports.** The need for logistic and personnel reports is self-explanatory. Logistic reports (LOGREPs) are mainly used to indicate major shortfalls. Personnel reports (PERSREPs) and medical reports (MEDASSESSREP) provide details of personnel and medical facts and figures.
- **Operational record report (OPRECREP).** The OPRECREP ensures regular and comprehensive reporting on a current operation. The information contains reports and details important for operational analysis, lessons learned and historical analyses.
- **Serious incident report (SINCREP).** The aim of a SINCREP is to inform the leaders in good time about any development which has operational, political and/or media implications.
- **Requests for information (RFI).** An RFI is an incidental request for specific information and is used mainly in the functional area of intelligence.

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# Glossary

Terms from AAP-6 NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS relevant for the JDP-5<sup>57</sup>

## Area of operations (AOO)

An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces.

## Area of responsibility (AOR)

- The geographical area assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
- In naval operations, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation.

## Assessment

The process of estimating the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel or systems. Note: In the context of military forces, the hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is: assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and certification.

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## Branches

Contingency options within a particular phase of an operation, planned and executed in response to anticipated opportunity or reversal within the phase, in order to provide the commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and ultimately achieve his original objective for that phase (AJP 5 Allied joint doctrine for operational planning).

## Campaign

A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.

## Caveat

In NATO operations, any limitation, restriction or constraint by a nation on its military forces or civilian elements under NATO command and control or otherwise available to NATO, that does not permit NATO commanders to deploy and employ these assets fully in line with the approved operation plan. Note: A caveat may apply *inter alia* to freedom of movement within the joint operations area and/or to compliance with the approved rules of engagement.

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<sup>57</sup> Unless stated otherwise

**Centre of gravity (COG)**

Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.

**Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)**

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.

**Combined force**

A force composed of elements of two or more nations.

**Combined joint operation**

An operation carried out by forces of two or more nations, in which elements of at least two services participate.

**Combined operation**

An operation conducted by forces of two or more Allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

**Command**

- The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.
- An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
- A unit, group of units, organization or area under the authority of a single individual.
- To dominate an area of situation.
- To exercise command.

**Command and control**

An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel, that enables commanders and their staffs to exercise command and control.

**Command post**

A unit's or subunit's headquarters where the commander and the staff perform their activities. In combat, a unit's or subunit's headquarters is often divided into echelons; the echelon in which the unit or subunit commander is located or from which he operates is called a command post.

**Component command**

- In the NATO military command structure, a third-level command organization with specific air, maritime or land capabilities that is responsible for operational planning and conduct of subordinate operations as directed by the NATO commander.
- A functional component command or service component command responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force.

**Component commander**

- A single-service or functional component commander at the third level of the NATO military command structure.
- A designated commander responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force.

**Consultation**

The exchange of views and the conduct of deliberations amongst the highest authorities of the Alliance and member nations aiming at harmonizing positions and formulating recommendations on issues of common concern. Note: Consultation may involve international organizations, Partner nations and, as required, other non-NATO nations.

**Control**

That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

**Course of action (COA)**

In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed.

**Decision point**

A point in space and time, identified during the planning process, where it is anticipated that the commander must make a decision concerning a specific course of action.

**Decisive point**

A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment.

**Doctrine**

Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

**End state**

The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved.

**Evaluation**

The structured process of examining activities, capabilities and performance against defined standards or criteria. Note: In the context of military forces, the hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is: assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and certification.

**Force protection (FP)**

All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force.

**Interoperability**

The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.

**Joint**

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate.

**Joint fires**

Fires applied during the employment of forces from two or more components, in coordinated action toward a common objective.

**Joint operations area (JOA)**

A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or missionspecific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations.

**Joint staff**

A staff formed of two or more of the services of the same country.

**Line of operation**

In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity.

**Lines of communications**

All the land, water, and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.

**Main attack**

- The principal attack or effort into which the commander throws the full weight of the offensive power at his disposal.
- An attack directed against the chief objective of the campaign, major operation or battle.

**Manoeuvre**

Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.

**Military strategy**

That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.

**National command**

A command that is organized by, and functions under the authority of, a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under a NATO commander.

**National commander**

A national commander, territorial or functional, who is normally not in the Allied chain of command.

**National component**

Any national forces of one or more services under the command of a single national commander, assigned to any NATO commander.

**National force commander**

Commander of national forces assigned as separate elements of subordinate Allied commands.

**National territorial commander**

A national commander who is responsible for the execution of purely national functions in a specific geographical area. He remains a national territorial commander regardless of any Allied status which may be assigned to him.

**Objective**

A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an adversary's force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander's plan and towards which the operation is directed.

**Operation**

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

**Operational art**

The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles.

**Operational level**

The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.

**Rules of engagement (ROE)**

Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

**Sequels**

options for subsequent operations within a campaign or the following phase(s) of an operation (AJP 5 Allied joint doctrine for operational planning).

**Strategic level**

The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them.

**Supported commander**

A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders.

**Supporting commander**

A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan.

**Tactical level**

The level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units.

**Targeting**

The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities.